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GIVE PEACE A CHANCE: HOW CONSIDERING 
PEACE PROCESS OBLIGATIONS WOULD 
HAVE IMPROVED THE RULINGS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND 
THE ISRAELI SUPREME COURT ON THE 
ISRAELI SECURITY BARRIER 
CHARLES F. MARTEL* 
“The armed conflict has left many dead and 
wounded . . . .Bereavement and pain wash over us.” 
-Aharon Barak, President, Supreme Court of Israel, 
from Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel1 
 
“I agree with almost all of what the Court has written . . . .My regrets 
are rather about what it has chosen not to write.” 
-Judge Rosalyn Higgins, International Court of Justice, 
from Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The remarks of President Barak and Judge Higgins reflect that 
much was at stake when the Supreme Court of Israel (Israeli Court) 
and International Court of Justice (ICJ) considered the Israeli 
 
Copyright © 2007 by Charles F. Martel. 
 * Charles Martel is an adjunct law professor at the American University Washington 
College of Law and has an LLM degree in Human Rights Law from the London School of 
Economics (LSE).  This Article expands on the dissertation he wrote in that program.  The 
author thanks Professor Conor Gearty, Director of the Rausing Centre for Human Rights at the 
LSE, for suggesting as a dissertation topic analysis of the two court decisions which are the 
subject of this article. 
 1. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807, reprinted in 43 
I.L.M. 1099 (2004). 
 2. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 20 (July 9) (separate opinion of Judge 
Higgins) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion]. 
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separation barrier.3  In Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel, the Israeli 
Court gave qualified approval to barrier construction in the occupied 
West Bank, but ordered the government to reroute barrier segments 
that caused disproportionate harm to Palestinians.4  The ICJ Advisory 
Opinion more broadly held that the entire West Bank barrier route 
violates international law.5 
This Article proposes an alternative analysis based on Israeli-
Palestinian peace process agreements.  The thesis is that the 
agreements provide a more precise framework of legal obligations for 
analyzing the barrier, and would more effectively promote peace than 
the approach in either decision. 
To paraphrase Judge Higgins, the agreements fill in what the 
courts “chose not to write.”6  The Israeli Court failed to consider the 
barrier as part of Israel’s illegal settlement policy in occupied 
territory.  As a result, Beit Sourik wrongly allows a route that 
perpetuates Israeli possession of occupied territory.  The ICJ 
dismissed Israeli security, and failed to consider that Palestinian 
failure to stop illegal terrorism led to Israel’s erection of the barrier.  
As a result, the Advisory Opinion wrongly ignores Palestinian legal 
responsibilities and imposes obligations only on Israel. 
An agreement-based framework directly addresses these issues 
by properly treating the barrier as the result of illegalities on both 
sides.  The analysis affirms Israel’s right to defend its citizens, 
including settlers.  However, barrier routes that perpetuate illegal 
Israeli possession of contested territory would be prohibited. 
Part I describes the barrier and summarizes the decisions.  Part II 
analyzes the decisions’ impact, showing that while the law now factors 
in the barrier route, the decisions have not effectively addressed 
issues central to the barrier, and the larger conflict of which the 
barrier is part.  Part III offers an agreement-based framework and 
critique of the decisions, comparing peace process obligations with 
 
 3. Supporters of the structure call it a fence, and opponents call it a wall.  While the 
barrier includes concrete walls up to twenty-five feet high, it is predominantly a combination of 
link and electric fences, trenches, patrol roads, and “no go zones” up to one hundred yards wide.  
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on 
Human Rights, John Dugard, On the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories 
Occupied by Israel Since 1967, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/6 (Sept. 8, 2003) (prepared by John 
Dugard) [hereinafter Rapporteur’s Report].  This Article will use the term “barrier” because its 
functional accuracy lends itself to neutrality. 
 4. Beit Sourik, [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807 para. 86. 
 5. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 paras. 137-38, 162. 
 6. Id. para. 20 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins). 
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sources of international law that impose similar responsibilities 
illustrating that the framework is legally correct and would better 
promote peace.7 
A final introductory note is that the decisions reflect the courts’ 
different roles.8  The ICJ is an international court and responded to 
the request of the United Nations General Assembly for a non-
binding advisory opinion on the entire barrier route.9  By contrast, the 
Israeli Court bore the constraints of a domestic court, making a 
binding ruling with national security implications on a small section of 
the barrier.10  It has been observed that the Israeli Court’s restraint on 
security issues contributes to its important ongoing authority in Israeli 
society.11  Some have concluded that the Israeli Court’s decision on 
the barrier was a continuation of this and that Beit Sourik was a more 
pragmatic, effective ruling than the broader Advisory Opinion.12  
Ultimately, because pending Israeli Court cases call for 
reconsideration of the barrier’s legality, the framework proposed here 
is offered not just as a critique of past decisions but as a suggestion for 
future ones. 
I.  BACKGROUND ON THE  
BARRIER AND SUMMARY OF THE DECISIONS 
A. The Barrier 
The Israeli government authorized the barrier in April 2002 after 
a sharp rise in terrorist attacks,13 stating that the barrier was a 
 
 7. The relevance of peace agreements to the barrier was suggested by Geoffrey R. 
Watson.  See Geoffrey R. Watson, The “Wall” Decisions in Legal and Political Context, 99 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 6, 22-24 (2005). 
 8. See Yuval Shany, Capacities and Inadequacies: A Look at the Two Separation Barrier 
Cases, 38 ISR. L. R. 230, 233 (2005). 
 9. Id. at 231. 
 10. Id. at 232. 
 11. See generally DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME 
COURT OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 187-98 (2002).  The Court is by far the 
most trusted political institution in Israel.  Yuval Yoaz, Public Rates Supreme Court as Most 
Trustworthy State Authority, HAARETZ (Isr.), June 14, 2005. 
 12. See David Kretzmer, The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of International 
Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 88, 90 n.22 (2005); Watson, supra note 7, at 25. 
 13. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Prepared Pursuant to General 
Assembly Resolution ES-10/13, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/ES-10/248 (Nov. 24, 2003) [hereinafter 
Secretary-General Report]; Written Statement of the Government of Israel, Advisory Opinion, 
2004 I.C.J. 131, at 7 (Jan. 30, 2004), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1579.pdf 
[hereinafter Israeli Statement]. 
02__MARTEL.DOC 10/4/2007  9:51:58 AM 
308 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 17:305 
temporary security measure, and not a political border.14  In October 
2003, the Israeli Cabinet approved a continuous 720-kilometer barrier 
route in and around the West Bank.15  Portions of the route tracked 
the 1949 Armistice Line (or “Green Line”) demarking Israel’s pre-
1967 border, but most of the barrier was in occupied territory.  The 
route placed approximately 16.6 percent of the occupied West Bank, 
237,000 Palestinians16 and eighty percent of the 400,000 Israeli settlers 
in occupied territory on the Israeli side of the barrier.17 
B. The Decisions 
1. Beit Sourik.  Beit Sourik was decided on June 30, 2004.  The 
case concerned challenges to forty kilometers of the barrier, with the 
Israeli Court invalidating thirty kilometers and ordering the 
government to plan new routes less injurious to Palestinians affected 
by the barrier.18   
The Israeli Court began by recognizing that Israel holds the West 
Bank in a state of belligerent occupation, and stating that the law of 
belligerent occupation applies to consideration of the barrier.19  The 
Israeli Court then identified two questions which determined the 
barrier’s legality: (1) whether West Bank barrier construction was 
illegal per se; and (2) if building the barrier in the West Bank was not 
illegal, whether the specific barrier segments challenged were illegal.20 
The Israeli Court answered the first question with a qualified, 
carefully limited approval of West Bank barrier construction.  The 
court described this as a “complex and multifaceted” issue that “did 
not receive full expression in the arguments,” confined its ruling as 
“dealing only with the arguments raised by the parties,” and 
preserved the question for reconsideration by deciding the issue 
“without exhausting it.”21 
 
 14. Israel took this position in both cases.  Israeli Statement, supra note 13, at 5; HCJ 
2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807 paras. 4, 6, 28-29. 
 15. Secretary-General Report, supra note 13, ¶ 6. 
 16. Id. ¶ 8. 
 17. See Rapporteur’s Report, supra note 3, ¶ 2; Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 122 
(July 9). 
 18. Beit Sourik, [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807 paras. 9, 60-62, 67, 70-72, 76, 80-86. 
 19. Id. para. 23. 
 20. Id. para. 25. 
 21. Id. 
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The approval of West Bank barrier construction was based on an 
acceptance of Israel’s position that the barrier was exclusively a 
temporary security measure.22  The court contrasted this with 
impermissible reasons for a West Bank route, including the desire “to 
‘annex’ territories to the state of Israel,” “to draw a political border” 
in order to create permanent, rather than temporary, arrangements, 
and other “reasons that are political.”23 
The Israeli Court then addressed the second question: the 
legality of the challenged barrier sections.  The court used a segment-
by-segment proportionality analysis with three parts, the third 
examining the proportionality of each segment by balancing its 
security benefits against the harm done to Palestinians.24  The court 
found that most of the segments caused disproportionate injury to 
Palestinians, and ordered the government to reroute them.25  The 
proportionality analysis included detailed consideration of the 
barrier’s humanitarian impact, including damage to livelihood, land 
deprivation, road access restrictions, limited barrier passage, property 
damage, and isolation through barrier encirclement.26 
2. The Advisory Opinion.  On July 9, 2004, the ICJ issued the 
Advisory Opinion in response to the General Assembly’s request for 
the ICJ’s direction on the legality of the barrier.27  After rejecting 
Israel’s arguments that the court did not have jurisdiction or, 
alternatively, that the court should exercise its discretion not to 
render an opinion because the issue was a political matter, the court 
proceeded to the merits.28  The ICJ identified four bodies of 
 
 22. Id. paras. 28-29, 32. 
 23. Id. para. 27. 
 24. Id. paras. 36-85. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. paras. 59, 63, 68, 71-73, 82, 84. 
 27. G.A. Res. ES-10/14, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/14 (Dec. 12, 2003). 
 28. Much of the ICJ opinion addressed the jurisdiction and discretion issues, which were 
the only issues formally contested by Israel.  Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 paras. 14-15, 25-
42, 163(1) (jurisdiction) (July 9); id. paras. 44-65, 163(2) (discretion).  Those issues are not 
addressed in detail in this article, which deals instead with the substantive rulings of the Israeli 
Court and the ICJ.  However, it should be acknowledged that the jurisdiction and discretion 
issues are of great significance and have been the subject of considerable disagreement and 
academic commentary.  One ICJ judge, Judge Buergenthal, voted against the majority’s ruling 
that the ICJ properly exercised its discretion to issue an advisory opinion in the case.  Advisory 
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 1 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal).  For examples of differing 
academic perspectives on the ICJ rulings on these issues, see Michla Pomerance, The ICJ’s 
Advisory Jurisdiction and the Crumbling Wall Between the Political and the Judicial, 99 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 26 (2005); Richard A. Falk, Toward Authoritativeness: The ICJ Ruling on Israel’s 
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international law applicable to the barrier: (1) restrictions on using 
force; (2) principles of self-determination; (3) international 
humanitarian law; and (4) international human rights law.29 
First, the ICJ considered implications of forcible acquisition of 
territory and self-determination.30  On these issues the court held that 
Israeli settlements in occupied territory violate international law,31 
specifically the right to self-determination, Security Council 
Resolution 242 (calling for Israeli withdrawal from occupied 
territories), and Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
(prohibiting deportation or transfer of occupant population into 
occupied territory).32  The ICJ expressly linked the illegality of the 
barrier to the illegality of the settlements, holding that the barrier 
route was illegal because it “gives expression in loco to the illegal 
measures taken by Israel with regard to Jerusalem and the 
settlements.”33  The ICJ did not directly rule that the barrier’s impact 
was permanent or constituted annexation, but noted that these were 
possibilities because the barrier and its regime “create a ‘fait 
accompli’ on the ground that could well become permanent, in which 
case . . . it would be tantamount to de facto annexation.”34 
Next, the ICJ cited a series of humanitarian law provisions, 
finding violations of four35: Articles 46 and 52 of the Hague 
Regulations (respectively prohibiting confiscation of private property 
and limiting requisitions),36 and Articles 49(6) (see preceding 
paragraph) and 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (prohibiting 
destruction of private property).37  While the ICJ stated that it 
considered the barrier an impediment to various human rights 
 
Security Wall, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 42 (2005); see also Julie Calidinio Schmid, Advisory Opinions 
on Human Rights: Moving Beyond A Pyrrhic Victory, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 415 (2006). 
 29. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 paras. 87-113. 
 30. Id. paras. 115-22. 
 31. Id. para. 120. 
 32. Id. paras. 117-18, 120. 
 33. Id. para. 122. 
 34. Id. paras. 121-22. 
 35. Id. paras. 132, 134; id. paras. 24-25 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins). 
 36. Convention [IV] Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: 
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land arts. 46, 52, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 
Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. 
 37. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 49(6), 
53, Aug.12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. 
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provisions, it did not definitively find violations of any specific 
provision.38 
The ICJ dismissed self-defense as a justification for the barrier, 
concluding that the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. 
Charter “has no relevance in this case.”39  There were two bases for 
this holding.  First, the ICJ held that Article 51 limited self-defense to 
a response to state attacks, and claimed Israel did not impute terrorist 
attacks to another state.40  Second, the ICJ held that U.N. Security 
Council resolutions 1368 and 1373, which recognize a right of self-
defense against terrorism,41 could not be invoked by Israel because 
the terrorist threat emanates from occupied territories controlled by 
Israel.42 
From this the ICJ moved to consideration of the consequences of 
the barrier’s illegality.  The ICJ stated that Israel must (1) comply 
with self-determination principles, international humanitarian law, 
and international human rights law;43 (2) stop West Bank barrier 
construction and dismantle completed West Bank barrier sections;44  
and (3) return property taken for the barrier or provide 
compensation.45 
The ICJ ruling on consequences included responsibilities for 
third party states.  Here, the ICJ instructed other states not to 
recognize, aid, or assist the illegal situation resulting from 
construction of the barrier.46  The court added that states must end 
the barrier’s impediments to Palestinian self-determination and that 
parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention must ensure Israeli 
compliance with the Convention.47 
The question of Palestinian duties was mentioned once by the 
ICJ, when it acknowledged that both Israel and Palestine are obliged 
“to protect civilian life” and that both took illegal actions.48  However, 
the ICJ did not issue specific findings or rulings in the dispositif on 
 
 38. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 paras. 133-34. 
 39. Id. para. 139. 
 40. Id. 
 41. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
 42. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 139. 
 43. Id. para. 149. 
 44. Id. para. 151. 
 45. Id. paras. 152-53. 
 46. Id. para. 159. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. para. 162. 
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Palestinian illegalities.  Nor did the ICJ instruct third party states as 
to any responsibilities regarding support or assistance of illegal 
Palestinian conduct. 
II.  ANALYSIS OF THE DECISIONS’ IMPACT 
A. Initial Political and Legal Reaction 
The Palestinian Authority criticized the Beit Sourik rerouting as 
“insufficient” and praised the Advisory Opinion as a victory.49  The 
Israeli government pledged to follow Beit Sourik and claimed it 
confirmed the barrier’s general legality, while denouncing the 
Advisory Opinion as a political decision which ignored Palestinian 
terrorism.50 
Despite the Israeli government’s rejection of the Advisory 
Opinion, the Israeli legal establishment called for consideration of the 
Opinion.  In August 2004, Attorney General Menachem Mazuz 
warned that the Opinion’s “negative ramifications” would be 
“difficult to overstate” and created a “political reality” that could lead 
to sanctions.51  President Ehud Barak stated that the Opinion 
required consideration and ordered the Israeli government to 
respond to it.52 
The Palestinian Authority used the Opinion to liken Israeli 
occupation to the South African apartheid system that was sanctioned 
and boycotted following adverse court decisions.53  Shortly after the 
ICJ’s decision, a prominent Israeli-Arab opponent of occupation 
stated that there was “no overstating the importance of the ruling” 
and that “the language of law” in “an impartial legal decision” can 
 
 49. Qurei Plays Down Israeli Decision on the Wall around Jerusalem, INT’L PRESS CTR. 
(Palestine), June 30, 2004, available at http://www.ipc.gov.ps/ipc_e/ipc_e-1/e_News/news2004/ 
2004_06/191.html; Press Release, Palestinian National Authority Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
PNA Hails ICJ’s Ruling over “Apartheid Wall” (July 9, 2004). 
 50. See Press Release, Prime Minister of Israel, Prime Minister Orders Continued 
Construction of the Separation Fence As Directed by the High Court of Justice (July 11, 2004). 
 51. Yuval Yoaz, Mazuz: Hague Ruling on Fence Could Lead to Sanctions on Israel, 
HAARETZ (Isr.), Aug. 20, 2004, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml? 
itemNo=467077. 
 52. Id. 
 53. The barrier is often referred to as an “apartheid wall” by Palestinians and others 
opposed to it.  See, e.g., Palestinian National Authority Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 
49. 
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“serve to build an international consensus.”54  The U.N. General 
Assembly voted overwhelmingly to demand Israeli compliance with 
the Advisory Opinion.55  The 115 nation Non-Aligned Movement 
adopted a resolution for boycotts and sanctions to enforce the 
Advisory Opinion, and various religious organizations also 
recommended such measures.56 
Over sixty petitions have been filed with the Israeli Court 
challenging the barrier, some resulting in government agreements to 
change its route.57  Israeli intra-governmental tension regarding the 
Advisory Opinion’s force continued when Attorney General Mazuz 
cited the Opinion as a reason for halting government use of absentee 
property laws to confiscate Palestinian property for East Jerusalem 
settlements.  Mazuz stopped the confiscations in part because of 
“grave international ramifications regarding the separation fence” 
and “the various aspects for which Israel has been severely criticized 
by the International Court.”58  He added, “This is a clear-cut case of 
Israel’s interests being to avoid opening new fronts in the 
international arena in general and in particular in the arena of 
international law.”59 
In February 2005, the Israeli government announced a new 
barrier route to comply with Beit Sourik and responded to the August 
2004 Israeli Court order to address the Advisory Opinion.60  The 
Israeli response stated the new route reduced West Bank territory on 
the Israeli side of the barrier by more than half.61 
 
 54. Azmi Bishara, Back to Context, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY (Cairo), July 19, 2004, available 
at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/699/op2.htm. 
 55. G.A. Res. ES-10/15, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/15 (Aug. 2, 2004). 
 56. Poor Nations Seek Ban on Firms Building Israeli Wall, NEW ZEALAND HERALD, Aug. 
21, 2004, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/index.cfm?ObjectID=3585663; see, e.g., 
Chris McGreal, Anglican Group Calls for Israel Sanctions: Campaigners Inspired by Boycott of 
Apartheid South Africa, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), Sept. 24, 2004, at Foreign Pages 18, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,1311571,00.html. 
 57. U.N. Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, The Humanitarian Impact of the 
West Bank Barrier on Palestinian Communities, Update No. 5, at 6, para. 34 (Mar. 2005), 
available at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/OCHABarRprt05_Full.pdf. 
 58. Yuval Yoaz, AG halts East Jerusalem Property Expropriation, HAARETZ (Isr.), Feb. 2, 
2005. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Press Release, Israel Ministry of Defense, Israel’s Response to the ICJ Advisory 
Opinion on the Security Fence (Feb. 28, 2005) (English summary) (available at 
http://www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/news.htm#news27). 
 61. Id. para. 20. 
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The response criticized the ICJ for relying on outdated 
information and unbalanced facts, particularly on terrorism and 
security.62  The government noted that the Opinion was nonbinding 
and contended that its substantive rulings were inappropriate because 
Israel did not consent to the proceedings.63  For these reasons the 
government maintained that the Advisory Opinion was inapplicable 
to Israeli Court barrier cases.64  Palestine criticized the new route, 
maintaining that the vast majority of the rerouted barrier remains in 
Palestinian territory, and that almost ninety percent of the settlers 
and ten percent of the West Bank are on the barrier’s Israeli side.65 
The barrier has been and continues to be the subject of further 
cases in the Israeli Court.  In one case, the Association for Civil 
Rights in Israel (ACRI) petitioned the court to enforce the Advisory 
Opinion and invalidate the entire West Bank barrier route.66  During 
a preliminary hearing in that case, President Barak stated that the 
Advisory Opinion is partly positive for Israel and predicted Israel 
would ultimately rely on the Opinion.67  In other Israeli Court 
proceedings, the Israeli government contradicted its position taken in 
both Beit Sourik and the Advisory Opinion that the barrier is 
exclusively a temporary security measure.  The court has admitted 
that parts of the barrier are too difficult to move and conceded that 
there are non-security reasons for the barrier route, including political 
motivations and retention of occupied territory for industrial 
development.68 
 
 62. Id. paras. 16, 20. 
 63. Id. paras. 12, 13. 
 64. Id. para. 23. 
 65. Press Release, PLO Negotiations Affairs Dep’t., Barrier to Peace: Assessment of 
Israel’s “New” Wall Route (Mar. 2005) (available at http://www.nad-plo.org/inner.php? 
view=facts_wall_f19bp). 
 66. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), Separation Barrier Route Violates 
International Law, http://www.acri.org.il/english-acri/engine/story.asp?id=210 (last visited Mar. 
22, 2007); ACRI, Route of Barrier Designed to Allow Settlement Expansion, 
http://www.acri.org.il/english-acri/engine/story.asp?id=212 (last visited Mar. 22, 2007). 
 67. Yuval Yoaz, Justice Barak: Parts of Int’l Fence Ruling are ‘Positive’ for Israel, 
HAARETZ (Isr.), May 9, 2005. 
 68. Yuval Yoaz, State Prosecution Concedes Political Aim for the Jerusalem Fence, 
HAARETZ (Isr.), June 21, 2005, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/Print 
ArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=590557.  Outside court, a government minister stated that the 
Jerusalem barrier was built to ensure a Jewish majority and not solely for security.  Yuval Yoaz, 
EU Solana Slams J’lem Fence: PA: It Makes Pullout Useless, HAARETZ (Isr.), July 11, 2005. 
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B. Judicial Developments—The Israeli Court Upholds Beit Sourik 
and Distinguishes the Advisory Opinion 
On September 15, 2005, the Israeli Court issued its first decision 
on the barrier after Beit Sourik and the Advisory Opinion in the case 
of Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel.69  The case concerned a 
segment of the barrier constructed to protect the Israeli West Bank 
settlement of Alfei Menashe.70  On the Israeli side of the barrier were 
the settlement, an Israeli access highway (connecting the settlement 
to Israel), and five Palestinian villages.71 
The Mara’abe decision included extensive discussion of Beit 
Sourik and the Advisory Opinion.72  The Israeli Court stated that it 
was appropriate to afford the ICJ Opinion “full appropriate weight to 
the norms of international law.”73  However, the Israeli Court 
declined to follow the ICJ ruling that all construction of the barrier in 
occupied territory was illegal.74  The Israeli Court’s rationale for 
distinguishing the Advisory Opinion was two-fold.  First, the court 
noted that the ICJ Opinion was not binding res judicata that it was 
required to follow.75  Second, the court stated that the Advisory 
Opinion was decided on a different factual basis than Beit Sourik and 
Mara’abe.76 
The Israeli Court explained that in its view, there were two 
primary factual differences between its own consideration of the 
barrier and that of the ICJ in the Advisory Opinion.  First, the Israeli 
Court stated that the ICJ analyzed only Palestinian injury and ignored 
the Israeli military-security reasons for building the barrier, 
identifying this as “the most important” factual difference between 
the two courts’ analyses and describing the ICJ’s failure to consider 
Israeli security concerns as a “severe oversight.”77  The second factual 
 
 69. HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel [2005] IsrSC 38(2) 393, available 
at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/570/079/a14/04079570.a14.pdf. 
 70. Id. paras. 8-9. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. paras. 33-74. 
 73. Id. para. 74. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. paras. 59-72. 
 77. Id. paras. 62-66.  The Israeli Court was diplomatic in its treatment of the Advisory 
Opinion, noting that it was not assessing blame for what it clearly viewed to be inadequate 
factual consideration of the Israeli position.  Id. para. 65.  The Court also correctly pointed out 
that several ICJ judges criticized the Advisory Opinion as a one-sided analysis that ignored 
Israel’s security rationale for the barrier.  Id. paras. 46, 52-55, 63-64.  The author agrees that the 
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difference claimed by the Israeli Court was that its procedures 
allowed for a balance of fully aired Palestinian and Israeli positions 
through an adversarial legal process; the Israeli Court contrasted this 
with ICJ proceedings, which the court maintained were limited to 
consideration of the Palestinian position untested by opposing parties 
or facts.78 
After reaching its conclusion regarding the Advisory Opinion, 
the Israeli Court stated it would adopt the Beit Sourik normative 
approach—a segment-by-segment proportionality analysis, in which 
the court would balance military and security necessity against the 
injury done to the local population.79  Application of the Beit Sourik 
approach led to a ruling quite similar to Beit Sourik.  The Israeli 
Court again held that the government had the general authority to 
construct the barrier in occupied territory, but nonetheless ordered 
the government to reroute the specific segment of the barrier under 
consideration because the segment illegally violated Palestinian 
rights.80 
As it had in Beit Sourik, the Israeli Court accepted without 
question the government’s central factual contentions regarding the 
barrier’s purpose and duration.  The court agreed with the 
government that the motivation for the barrier was security rather 
than creation of a political border,81 and that the barrier is “inherently 
temporary.”82 
The Israeli Court then proceeded to apply the three part 
proportionality analysis it formulated in Beit Sourik.83  Here, the 
Mara’abe ruling differed somewhat from Beit Sourik in two ways that 
potentially make Mara’abe a more expansive invalidation of Israeli 
occupation tactics.  First, in Mara’abe, the court held that the Alfei 
Menashe barrier segment was invalid because it failed to pass the 
second prong of the proportionality test—whether it was the least 
injurious means of providing the security protection sought.84  The 
 
ICJ’s failure to consider Israeli security and defense rights is a severe error of law with 
significant adverse legal and political consequences.  See infra Part III.C-D. 
 78. Mara’abe, [2005] IsrSC 38(2) 393 para. 69.  The Israeli Court did not address or criticize 
the ICJ rulings on jurisdiction and discretion. 
 79. Id. para. 74. 
 80. Id. paras. 98-99, 110-16. 
 81. Id. paras. 98-101. 
 82. Id. para. 100. 
 83. Id. paras. 110-16. 
 84. Id. paras. 112-14. 
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court suggested that a barrier which encircled the settlement but did 
not place the five Palestinian villages on the Israeli side would be an 
acceptable less injurious means of protecting the settlement.85  The 
Israeli Court’s tacit approval of the alternative of a “ringlet barrier” 
in Mara’abe goes farther than Beit Sourik.  There, the court bypassed 
the issue of suggesting less injurious alternatives, instead invalidating 
segments based on the third prong of the test (a balance of interests) 
and leaving the rerouting up to the government.86 
The second expansion from Beit Sourik was that, in Mara’abe, 
the Israeli Court ordered the government to consider building a new 
Israeli settlement access road, and thus its ruling was not limited to 
the barrier route.87  The court required the rerouting of the road 
because the hardship imposed on Palestinians by the barrier route 
was exacerbated by the fact that the route protected the road.  The 
court’s connection of the barrier to other occupation infrastructure 
goes beyond its prior reluctance to view the facets of the occupation 
as integrated.88 
C. Conclusions Regarding the Decisions’ Impact 
Several conclusions as to the decisions’ impact can be drawn.  
First, the ICJ Advisory Opinion aids the Palestinian legal/political 
strategy of intensifying international pressure on Israel by casting it as 
an outlaw state meriting punitive isolation in the mold of apartheid 
South Africa.  Second, the Opinion, though publicly disregarded by 
the Israeli government, nonetheless influences the barrier due to 
international pressure, supportive treatment from Israel’s legal 
establishment, and ongoing court cases.89 
Third, pressure from the ICJ Opinion weighs exclusively on 
Israel.  All rulings of illegality in the Opinion were against Israel.90  
The ICJ’s instructions on the consequences of its finding consisted 
exclusively of obligations for Israel and third party states supporting 
Israel.91  The ICJ did not make any findings of Palestinian illegality, 
nor did it address whether Palestinian violations of law led to the 
 
 85. Id. para. 113. 
 86. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807 paras. 59-62, 70-
71, 76, 80, 82-86. 
 87. Mara’abe, [2005] IsrSC 38(2) 393 para. 116. 
 88. See infra Part III.B. 
 89. See Kretzmer, supra note 12, at 101. 
 90. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text. 
 91. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. 
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Israeli decision to construct the barrier.  There were no instructions 
from the ICJ to third party states not to support Palestinian illegality 
related to the barrier.  Unsurprisingly, the ICJ Opinion has not led to 
legal or political pressure on Palestine (or its allies) to stop the illegal 
terrorism against which the barrier defends. 
As to the impact of the Israeli Court’s decision, the first and most 
obvious result is that the barrier was rerouted in response to Beit 
Sourik and other proceedings, but this change was insufficient to end 
legal and political controversy because Beit Sourik allows a barrier 
route that winds through occupied territory.92  Second, the law is an 
ongoing constraint on the government’s construction of the barrier 
because Israeli Court involvement continues as demonstrated by 
Mara’abe and other post-Beit Sourik petitions. 
Third, Israeli Court orders and governmental statements, such as 
those of Attorney General Mazuz, have given some official support 
and vitality to the ICJ Opinion in Israel.93  Although the Israeli Court 
declined to follow the ICJ Opinion, it has not rejected the ICJ’s 
exercise of jurisdiction.94  The court further indicated that the ICJ 
Opinion carries weight and afforded the Opinion careful 
consideration,95 and, in its post-Opinion decision in Mara’abe, edged 
to a slightly more critical perspective of the barrier, including 
consideration of other components of the settlement infrastructure.96  
The Attorney General expressed concerns with the legal and political 
impact of the Opinion and linked those concerns to a substantive 
 
 92. See supra notes 21 (Beit Sourik approval of West Bank route), 57, 60 (Israeli 
government changes in barrier route in response to Beit Sourik), 49-50, 57, 60 (continuing legal 
and political disputes over West Bank barrier route) and accompanying text.  The political 
contestation of the barrier in Israel and Palestine is reflected in continuing legal petitions to the 
Israeli Court.  See, e.g., ACRI, Jerusalem Envelope Imprisons Residents of Hirbat and al-Wata, 
http://www.acri.org.il/english-acri/engine/story.asp?id=264 (last visited Mar. 21, 2007).  The fact 
that the continued presence of the barrier in the West Bank has international political 
consequences for Israel is demonstrated by the so-called “Quartet” that sponsors the “Road 
Map” peace plan (the United States, Russia, European Union, and United Nations).  See Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Quartet Statement on Middle East Peace (Sept. 20, 2006) 
(available at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/72900.htm) (Quartet expressing concern that the 
barrier route “appears to prejudge the borders of a Palestinian state”). 
 93. See supra notes 66 (discussing Israeli Court involvement), 52, 58 (attorney general’s 
positions) and accompanying text. 
 94. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text. 
 95. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text. 
 96. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text. 
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policy decision on another facet of the occupation—confiscation of 
Palestinian property.97 
Fourth, Israeli Court proceedings precipitated concessions by the 
government that the motivations for the barrier include several 
identified as impermissible in Beit Sourik.98  Israeli government 
admissions that motives include political and industrial 
considerations, and that barrier segments will be difficult to remove, 
contradict the government’s previous representations that the barrier 
is solely a temporary security measure.99  Because the now-
contradicted governmental representations of an exclusive security 
rationale were the basis of the Israeli Court’s ruling that barrier 
construction in the West Bank is not per se illegal in Beit Sourik, these 
developments leave open the possibility of broader Israeli Court 
rulings against the barrier.  The Mara’abe decision shows that the 
court’s course is likely to be a gradual expansion of its authority over 
barrier routing through a series of applications of the Beit Sourik 
segment-by-segment proportionality analysis, rather than an outright 
ban on West Bank barrier construction.100 
While the decisions unquestionably have had significant 
consequences, they leave much unchanged.  Peace talks languish, 
Israeli settlements in contested territories persist, and Palestinian 
terrorist attacks (while diminished) continue.  The judicially rerouted 
barrier is still a source of conflict, because a large portion of contested 
occupied territory, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, and most 
Israeli settlers remain on the Israeli side of the barrier.101 
It would be naïve to expect judicial resolution of all this.  Yet, 
even the flawed court rulings had real political results and led to 
physical changes in the barrier route.  Part III of this Article presents 
an agreement-based framework as legally better reasoned and 
politically more constructive.  Given that the judicial decisions on the 
 
 97. See supra notes 51, 58-59 and accompanying text. 
 98. Compare supra note 68 (government admissions that barrier has non-security 
purposes) with supra notes 13-14 (prior government position that the barrier was a temporary 
measure intended exclusively for security). 
 99. Compare supra note 68 with supra notes 13-14. 
 100. The Israeli Court’s treatment of the barrier includes injunctions, suggestive statements 
at hearings, and encouragement of out-of-court settlement, methods previously described by 
Professor Kretzmer as part of 
the court’s restraining or “shadow” influence on the government.  KRETZMER, supra note 11, at 
189-90.  Perhaps the longest cast of the Israeli Court’s shadow is the possibility that it will follow 
the ICJ by ruling more broadly against the barrier in the future. 
 101. See supra notes 65, 92 and accompanying text. 
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barrier have had a tangible impact, a better-reasoned analysis based 
on bilateral peace obligations could lead not just to more even-
handed and legally sound decisions, but also to political responses 
that could help revive the peace process itself.102 
III.  ANALYSIS OF THE BARRIER  
AND DECISIONS UNDER PEACE PROCESS AGREEMENTS 
A. The Peace Agreements and the Barrier 
1. The Agreements Generally.  There are two sources of Israeli-
Palestinian peace process obligations pertinent to the barrier.  The 
first is the 1993-99 series of agreements popularly referred to as the 
“Oslo Accords.”103  The second is “the Roadmap” proposed in 2003 
by the United States, the Russian Federation, the European Union 
and the United Nations, (collectively referred to as “the Quartet”),104 
adopted by the U.N. Security Council.105  The Roadmap was accepted 
by Israel (with fourteen reservations)106 and Palestine.107  Both the 
Oslo agreements and the Roadmap call for an immediate cessation of 
 
 102. This Article’s critique of the two decisions does not mean disagreement with them 
entirely.  To the contrary, there are constructive rulings in both decisions that are consistent 
with my proposal that an agreement-based analysis be used.  Those rulings include the 
humanitarian considerations of the Israeli Court in Beit Sourik as well as the court’s laudable 
and detailed concern with the suffering of civilians.  This Article also concurs with the ICJ’s 
Advisory Opinion rulings on jurisdiction, discretion, legal status of the settlements, and 
applicability of humanitarian and human rights law.  An agreement-based analysis could be 
applied with such rulings. 
 103. The relevant Oslo agreements are: (1) Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
Government Arrangements, Isr.-Palestine, Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1525 (1993) [hereinafter 
1993 Declaration of Principles]; (2) Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip, Isr.-Palestine, Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 558 (1997) [hereinafter 1995 Interim 
Agreement]; (3) Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, Note for the Record, Isr.-
Palestine, Jan. 15, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 665 (1997) [hereinafter Note for the Record]; (4) Wye River 
Memorandum, Isr.-Palestine, Oct. 23, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1251 (1998) [hereinafter Wye River]; and 
(5) Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, Isr.-Palestine, Sept. 4, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 1465 (1999) 
[hereinafter Sharm el-Sheikh]. 
 104. The Secretary-General, Letter from the Secretary General to the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/529 (May 7, 2003) [hereinafter Roadmap]. 
 105. S.C. Res. 1515, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1515 (Nov. 19, 2003). 
 106. See Press Release, Isr. Gov’t Press Office, Statement from the Prime Minister’s Bureau 
(May 25, 2003) (available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2003/05/mil-
030525-israel-pm01.htm); Israel’s Roadmap Reservations, HAARETZ (Isr.), available at 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=297230 (last visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
 107. See Peres: Abbas is “Best Man Available,” CNN.COM, May 1, 2003, 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/05/01/cnna.peres/index.html. 
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violence ultimately followed by permanent status negotiations on 
territorial issues including Jerusalem, borders, and the settlements.108 
Disposition of the West Bank and Jerusalem is reserved for final 
negotiations.109 
The agreements impose legal obligations relevant to three issues 
that go directly to the barrier’s causes and consequences: (1) Israeli 
changes in the status of contested territory; (2) Palestinian 
responsibility for terrorism; and (3) Israeli self-defense.110  The 
wisdom of using the agreements as an analytical framework for 
determining the legality of the barrier is best shown by this—there 
would be no barrier if Israel and Palestine complied with the 
agreements. 
2. Obligations Relevant to the Barrier 
a. Israeli Obligation Not to Change the Status of Occupied 
Territory.  Peace agreement obligations to preserve the territorial 
status quo in the occupied territories are relevant to the legality of the 
barrier because much of the barrier is in occupied territories and 
protects Israeli settlers who live in the territories as well as Israeli 
settlement infrastructure located there.  The 1995 Interim Agreement 
 
 108. 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 103, pmbl., art. XXXI, § 5; Roadmap, supra note 
104, at 2-8.  The issue of whether the initiation of permanent status negotiations is conditioned 
on an end to violence has been contested and is not entirely clear from the language of the 
agreements.  The 1995 Interim Agreement called for permanent status negotiations to begin 
after preliminary matters were resolved.  1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 103, art. XXXI, § 
5; see also Note for the Record, supra note 103, at 665-66 (describing duties under agreements, 
including “fighting terror and preventing violence,” and continuing interim agreement 
negotiations are to be dealt with “immediately and in parallel,” with permanent status 
negotiations to resume subsequently to implementation of earlier agreements).  Under the later 
Wye River and Sharm el-Sheikh agreements, ending violence and participating in permanent 
status negotiations were simultaneous and contemporaneous obligations.  Wye River, supra 
note 103, art. II, §§ A-B (recognizing anti-terror obligations), art. IV (stating that “[t]he two 
sides will immediately resume permanent status negotiations on an accelerated basis”); Sharm 
el-Sheikh, supra note 103, para. 1 (calling for prompt resumption of permanent status 
negotiations within ten days of the Memorandum’s creation).  The Roadmap consists of a three-
phase process, with Phase I including a bilateral end to violence and a freeze on Israeli 
settlement expansion, Phase II calling for a transitional Palestinian state, and Phase III 
requiring permanent status negotiations.  Roadmap, supra note 104, at 2-8.  Regardless of what 
the agreements say, it is politically impossible for a permanent territorial agreement to be 
negotiated and complied with as long as the two sides continue to attack and kill each other’s 
citizens. 
 109. 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 103, art. XXXI, § 5; Roadmap, supra note 104, at 
7. 
 110. See infra Part III.A.2.a-d. 
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prohibits changes in the status of the territories until a final 
agreement is reached: 
The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single 
territorial unit, the integrity and status of which will be preserved 
during the interim period. 
.  .  .  . 
Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the 
status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of 
permanent status negotiations.111 
This preservation obligation continued in the Wye River agreement 
provision barring “Unilateral Actions”:  “Recognizing the necessity 
to create a positive environment for the negotiations, neither side 
shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West 
Bank . . . in accordance with the Interim Agreement.”112  Sharm el-
Sheikh contains materially identical language.113  The Oslo 
agreements’ status obligations are preserved in the Roadmap, which 
expressly sustains the Oslo territorial requirements by calling for 
“implementation of prior agreements, to enhance maximum 
territorial contiguity of the provisional Palestinian state.”114  The 
territorial preservation obligations freeze the territorial status quo 
until permanent negotiations conclude,115 and thus prevent either 
party from unilaterally taking territory that is subject to permanent 
status negotiations. 
b. Palestinian Obligation to Stop Terrorism.  Peace agreement 
obligations requiring Palestine to end terrorism are relevant to the 
legality of the barrier because the barrier is intended to defend 
 
 111. 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 103, arts. XI § 1, XXXI § 7 (continuing a similar 
1993 provision).  The “interim period” is the time between the 1995 Interim Agreement and the 
permanent status negotiations.  Id. pmbl. 
 112. Wye River, supra note 103, art. V. 
 113. Sharm el-Sheikh, supra note 103, para. 10. 
 114. Roadmap, supra note 104, at 7.  The Israeli reservations to the Roadmap do not 
disclaim the obligation to leave the status of occupied territories unchanged or the reservation 
of territorial issues for permanent status negotiations.  See Israel’s Roadmap Reservations, supra 
note 106. 
 115. The 1995 Interim Agreement prohibited territorial status change not just prior to the 
permanent status negotiations, but also through the outcome of the negotiations.  1995 Interim 
Agreement, supra note 103, arts. XI, XXXI § 7.  Later agreements also recognized that 
unilateral pre-negotiation territorial status changes would foil the purpose of permanent status 
talks: both the Wye River and Sharm el-Sheikh agreements recognize that because of “the 
necessity to create a positive environment for the negotiations, neither side shall initiate or take 
any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in accordance with the 
Interim Agreement.”  See Wye River, supra note 103; Sharm el-Sheikh, supra note 103. 
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against Palestinian terrorism.116  The agreement of the Palestinian 
governmental entity to stop using terrorism has been a condition of 
the peace process from its beginning in 1993: “The PLO renounces 
the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume 
responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure 
their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators.”117  In 
the 1995 Interim Agreement, Palestine moved beyond renunciation 
of using terrorism to a commitment to prevent all terrorism 
emanating from Palestine: “Both sides shall take all measures 
necessary to prevent acts of terrorism, crimes and hostilities directed 
against each other, against individuals falling under the other’s 
authority .  .  . and shall take legal measures against offenders.”118  
Anti-terror protections are not selective as they extend to all persons 
in Israel and the occupied territories.  The 1995 Interim Agreement 
Annex requires both sides to “protect all residents and other persons 
present” in Gaza and the West Bank.119  The italicized language 
extends anti-terror protections to settlers, who are “residents” and 
“persons present” “under Israel’s authority” in the territories. 
The subsequent Oslo agreements increased the specificity of 
Palestine’s commitments to stop terrorism.  Palestine agreed to more 
explicit anti-terrorism obligations in the 1997 Note for the Record, 
which listed among the “Palestinian Responsibilities” “fighting terror 
and preventing violence,” “combating systematically and effectively 
terrorist organizations and infrastructure,” and “[a]pprehension, 
prosecution and punishment of terrorists.”120  The 1998 Wye River 
Memorandum established that: 
[T]he struggle against terror and violence must be comprehensive 
in that it deals with terrorists, the terror support structure, and the 
environment conducive to the support of terror.  It must be 
continuous and constant over a long-term, in that there can be no 
pauses in the work against terrorists and their structure.121 
 
 116. See supra notes 13-14, 22.  While the placement of the barrier in occupied territories 
and Israeli government statements show that some purposes for the barrier are not related to 
defense and are legally impermissible, see supra note 68, self-defense against terrorist attacks 
would be a legitimate reason for security measures, including a barrier, so long as such measures 
meets principles of proportionality.  See infra Part III.D. 
 117. See Exchange of Letters between Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin (Sept.  9, 1993), 
available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israel-
PLO+Recognition+-+Exchange+of+Letters+betwe.htm. 
 118. 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 103, art. XV § 1(emphasis added). 
 119. Id. annex I, art. II § 3(a) (emphasis added). 
 120. Note for the Record, supra note 103, at 666. 
 121. Wye River, supra note 103, art. II. 
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Wye River included anti-terrorism duties identical to those of the 
1995 Interim Agreement as well as the duty to “eliminate terrorist 
cells and the support structure that plans, finances, supplies and abets 
terror.”122  Wye River also established specific Palestinian obligations 
to prevent incitement and prohibit importation and use of illegal 
weapons.123  In the 1999 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, Palestine 
reaffirmed that it would “immediately and effectively respond to the 
occurrence or anticipated occurrence of an act of terrorism” and 
“take all necessary measures to prevent such an occurrence.”124 
Under the Roadmap, the Palestinian obligation of “Ending 
Terror” is part of Phase I, which requires that “Palestinians 
immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of violence” and 
that “Palestinians declare an unequivocal end to violence and 
terrorism and undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, 
disrupt and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning 
violent attacks on Israelis anywhere.”125  The Roadmap, like the Oslo 
agreements, obliges Palestine to take all necessary preventive action 
against terrorism and protects settlers as well as residents of Israel 
because it covers “Israelis anywhere.”126  The Roadmap, like the Oslo 
agreements, prohibits incitement of violence and requires its 
prevention127 and calls for third party anti-terrorism steps, requiring a 
“cut off [of] public and private funding and all other forms of support 
for groups supporting and engaging in violence and terror.”128  Thus, 
the Oslo agreements and the Roadmap establish a comprehensive 
Palestinian duty to prevent terrorism and its encouragement as well 
as to respond to terrorism immediately and effectively, with third-
party states also prohibited from supporting terrorism. 
c. Israel’s Right to Self-Defense.  The peace agreements’ 
recognition of Israeli self-defense rights is relevant to the legality of 
the barrier because the barrier is a defensive measure built in 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Sharm el-Sheikh, supra note 103, para. 8(a). 
 125. Roadmap, supra note 104, at 3.  The Security Council Resolution adopting the 
Roadmap imposed similar duties.  S.C. Res. 1515, supra note 105 (demanding “immediate 
cessation of violence, including all acts of terrorism”). 
 126. Roadmap, supra note 104, at 3. 
 127. Id; S.C. Res. 1515, supra note 105; Wye River, supra note 103, art. II § A(3); Sharm el-
Sheikh, supra note 103, para. 8(a). 
 128. Roadmap, supra note 104, at 4. 
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response to a surge in Palestinian terrorism.129  Israel’s right to defend 
against terrorism is expressly preserved in the 1995 Interim 
Agreement: 
Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility for defense against  
external threats . . . as well as the responsibility for overall security 
of Israelis and Settlements, for the purposes of safeguarding their 
internal security and public order, and will have all the powers to 
take the steps necessary to meet this responsibility.130 
The right of self-defense is further acknowledged in the agreements’ 
authorizations of all necessary measures for prevention and response 
to terrorism.131 
d. The Agreements Create Binding Legal Obligations.  The 
language in the Oslo agreements and their treatment by Israel and 
Palestine demonstrate that the agreements are legally binding.132  The 
1995 Interim Agreement identifies “recognizing . . . mutual legitimate 
and political rights” as one of its purposes.133  The agreements refer to 
“rights,” “obligations,” and “responsibilities.”134  Later agreements 
preserve obligations from preceding agreements.135 
The Roadmap commitments are also binding.  The Roadmap 
includes language of obligation and was accepted by Israel and 
Palestine.136  It is binding for the additional reason that it was adopted 
by the U.N. Security Council to promote peace and security.137 
Although the goal of the Oslo agreements was a final peace 
agreement by May 1999, the obligations in the accords were not 
contingent on reaching a final agreement and the obligations have not 
 
 129. See supra notes 13-14, 22 and accompanying text. 
 130. 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 103, art. XII § 1.  The Israeli right to defend 
citizens and settlements is in addition to, not limited to, response to external threats.  Id.; see 
also 1993 Declaration of Principles, supra note 103, annex II (preserving Israeli responsibility 
for “external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis” 
following military withdrawal from the occupied territories). 
 131. 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 103, art. XV § 1, annex I, arts. I § 7, II; see also 
Wye River, supra note 103, art. II; Sharm el-Sheikh, supra note 103, para. 8(a). 
 132. See Watson, supra note 7, at 22. 
 133. 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 103, pmbl. 
 134. See, e.g., Note for the Record, supra note 103, at 665-66; Wye River, supra note 103, 
pmbl.; Sharm el-Sheikh, supra note 103, para. 8. 
 135. E.g., Wye River, supra note 103, pmbl.; Sharm el-Sheik, supra note 103, pmbl. 
 136. See Roadmap, supra note 104, at 2 (referring to “obligations” of parties).  See also S.C. 
Res. 1515, supra note 105 (same in Security Council resolution adopting Roadmap). 
 137. See S.C. Res. 1515, supra note 105; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, paras. 108-16 (June 21). 
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been terminated by Israel or Palestine.138  Indeed, Oslo obligations as 
to terrorism and status change have been reaffirmed since May 1999 
in Sharm el-Sheikh and the Roadmap.139  Israel and Palestine 
contended in ICJ proceedings that the Oslo agreements and 
Roadmap were binding,140 and both have since treated the Oslo 
agreements and Roadmap as having ongoing validity.141 
e. Judicial Neglect of Peace Process Agreements.  One would 
think the courts would have carefully reviewed the peace agreements 
in determining the legality of the barrier.  The peace process 
obligations directly address the reasons for the barrier, because the 
barrier (1) is a self-defense measure built to defend against terrorist 
violence barred by the agreements; and (2) changes the status of 
occupied territory, in violation of the agreements, because that is 
where much of the barrier is.  All of this involves violations of 
obligations expressly accepted by Israel and Palestine in the peace 
agreements.  In fact, the obligations violated by the barrier—those 
which require an end to violence and preservation of territory to 
allow meaningful permanent status negotiation—are the very purpose 
of the peace agreements. 
 
 138. See Watson, supra note 7, at 23-24. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See Israeli Statement, supra note 13, at 20-34; Written Statement submitted by 
Palestine, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, 169-71 (Jan. 29, 2004), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/131/1555.pdf [hereinafter Palestinian Statement]. 
 141. On their websites, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Palestinian Authority 
have included detailed explanations of the Oslo agreements in discussing their respective 
commitments to peace.  The Israeli government continues to take the position that the peace 
agreements had force.  See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Webpage, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).  At the time this article was submitted for 
publication in October 2006, it was unclear whether the Palestinian Authority continued to 
consider the peace agreements binding.  Authority President Mahmoud Abbas stated that the 
Authority accepted the agreements and intended to comply with them, while Hamas, which 
controlled the Authority legislature, had not accepted the agreements.  Nidal al-Mughrabi, 
Hamas Gives Vision for Governing to Abbas, REUTERS, Mar. 10, 2006, available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2006/03/10/hamas_gives_vision_for_gove
rning_to_abbas; see also President Abbas for International Conference on Palestinian-Israeli 
Conflict, ARABIC NEWS.COM, Apr. 26, 2006, http://arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/060426/ 
2006042611.html (Abbas stated that Palestine remains committed to Oslo agreements and 
Roadmap and that Hamas election is not an obstacle to negotiation from the agreements).  The 
Quartet that sponsored the Roadmap called for Hamas to accept the peace agreements.  At UN 
Meeting, Quartet Hopes New Palestinian Government Leads to Renewed Engagement, U.N. 
NEWS CTR., Sept. 20, 2006, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=19927&Cr= 
Middle&Cr1=Quartet. 
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Despite this, the two courts scarcely mentioned Oslo and the 
Roadmap and completely neglected to apply the agreements’ key 
substantive obligations to their analyses of the barrier.142  The Israeli 
Court referred to “a political process” that began in 1993 but made no 
further reference to it.143  The ICJ vaguely acknowledged that the 
Oslo agreements imposed “various obligations on each party,” 
included “various other commitments,” and discussed Oslo mutual 
recognition provisions, but went no further.144 The ICJ’s references to 
the Roadmap did not address substantive requirements.145  Neither 
the Israeli Court in Beit Sourik, nor the ICJ in the Advisory Opinion 
examined, or even mentioned, the status preservation, anti-terrorism, 
or self-defense provisions in the Oslo agreements and the 
Roadmap.146 
The ICJ neglect of Oslo and Roadmap obligations is particularly 
perplexing for two reasons.  First, the agreements were central to ICJ 
submissions of the General Assembly, Israel, and Palestine.  The 
General Assembly request referred to “agreements reached between 
the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization 
in the context of the Middle East peace process.”147  Israel’s written 
statement included extensive discussion of Palestinian anti-terrorism 
obligations in the Oslo agreements and the Roadmap.148  Palestine 
cited Israeli Oslo agreement obligations in arguing the barrier was an 
 
 142. Watson, supra note 7, at 22-24. 
 143. HCJ 2056/04, Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807 para. 1.  It has 
been suggested that the Israeli Court’s reluctance to apply Israel’s international agreements to 
the barrier is understandable.  Watson, supra note 7, at 24.  However, the court has considered 
such agreements on security matters, relying in part on international treaties to which Israel is a 
signatory, in holding that certain state anti-terror interrogation methods are illegal.  See, e.g., 
HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817, 
reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1471 (1999).  Moreover, in Mara’abe, the Israeli Court recognized that at 
least one Oslo instrument, the 1995 Interim Agreement, has “legal status” in the occupied 
territories.  HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel [2005] IsrSC 38(2) 393 para. 20. 
 144. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 paras. 77, 118 (July 9). 
 145. Id. paras. 22, 51-53, 162. 
 146. In Mara’abe, the Israeli Court cited approvingly a single Oslo provision—Article 
XII(1) of the 1995 Interim Agreement, which preserved Israel’s right to protect its citizens and 
the settlements.  Mara’abe [2005] IsrSC 38(2) 393, para. 20.  However, the Israeli Court entirely 
ignored the Oslo Agreements’ repeated prohibitions of status change in the occupied territories 
and the obvious implications of the status change prohibitions on the barrier and the larger 
settlement program.  This highly selective application of Oslo, limited as it is to Israeli rights, 
while excluding analysis of provisions recognizing Palestinian rights and Israeli obligations, is 
hard to square with the Israeli Court’s criticism of the ICJ for a one-sided review biased toward 
the Palestinian position.  See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. 
 147. G.A. Res. ES-10/14, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/14 (Dec. 10, 2003). 
 148. Israeli Statement, supra note 13, at i-ii, 20-33, 40-54. 
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illegal change in status that prejudiced the outcome of peace 
negotiations.149  None of this was addressed in the Opinion. 
There is a second and more substantive reason that judicial 
neglect of Oslo and the Roadmap is a significant failing.  As will be 
demonstrated in the next section, the three relevant obligations from 
the peace agreements—preserving the status of occupied territories, 
stopping terrorist violence, and allowing self-defense—conform to 
international law principles independent of the agreements.  Either 
court could have applied the peace agreements and demonstrated 
that complying with the agreements, following international law, and 
promoting peace all require both parties to do what they promised to 
do in the peace agreements, and that had the parties done so, the 
barrier would never have been built. 
Next, this Article will show how Israel’s obligation not to change 
the status of occupied territories under the agreements is substantially 
identical to what is required under international law.  It will then 
describe how the barrier is part of a continuing Israeli violation of 
that obligation. 
B. Israeli Breach of Status Preservation Obligations 
1. Legal Sources of the Obligation.  There are two sources for 
Israel’s obligation not to change the status of the territories: (1) the 
peace process agreements; and (2) the law of belligerent occupation. 
a. Prohibition of Status Change under the Agreements.  From 
the beginning of the Oslo process in 1993, Israel agreed not to change 
the status of the West Bank.150  Status preservation provisions prevent 
changes prior to the outcome of permanent status negotiations.151  The 
1993 Declaration of Principles and 1995 Interim Agreement 
confirmed that the West Bank’s integrity and status will be preserved 
during the interim period before final negotiations.152  In Wye River 
and Sharm el-Sheikh, the parties reaffirmed that “neither side shall 
initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank” 
 
 149. Palestinian Statement, supra note 140, paras. 143, 151, 154, 156, 376-81. 
 150. 1993 Declaration of Principles, supra note 103, art. IV; 1995 Interim Agreement, supra 
note 103, art. XI § 1; Wye River, supra note 103, art. V; Sharm el-Sheikh, supra note 103, para. 
10. 
 151. See supra notes 111-115 and accompanying text. 
 152. See 1993 Declaration of Principles, supra note 103, art. IV; 1995 Interim Agreement, 
supra note 103, art. XI § 1. 
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and recognized that this promoted “the need to create a positive 
environment for the negotiations.”153  The Roadmap continued Oslo 
territorial status obligations, requiring “implementation of prior 
agreements, to enhance the maximum territorial contiguity, including 
further action on settlements in conjunction with establishment of a 
Palestinian state with provisional borders.”154 
b. Status Change under the Law of Belligerent Occupation.  
Both the ICJ and the Israeli Court recognized that Israel holds the 
West Bank in belligerent occupation.155  One of the principles of the 
law of belligerent occupation is that the occupying power must 
preserve the status of the occupied territory so as to eventually return 
the territory to a legitimate sovereign government.156  The primary 
bodies of law governing belligerent occupation are Section III of the 
Hague Regulations (Articles 42-56) and the Fourth Geneva 
Convention (Article 4, § III, and Articles 47-78).  This body of law 
imposes restrictions on the authority of an occupying power while 
allowing (sometimes requiring) an occupier to benefit the occupied 
population and permitting the occupying power to protect the 
security of its military.157  The provisions of belligerent occupation law 
restrain and prohibit occupying powers from taking a series of specific 
acts which would transform territorial and property rights in occupied 
territory.158 
The central limiting principle underlying the whole of belligerent 
occupation law is that an occupier’s authority is temporary.159  Since 
belligerent occupation is temporary, the law prevents an occupier 
from unilateral measures preempting the disposition of occupied 
 
 153. Wye River, supra note 103, art. V; Sharm El-Sheikh, supra note 103, para. 10. 
 154. Roadmap, supra note 104, at 7. 
 155. HCJ 2056/04, Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807 paras. 1, 23; 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, paras. 73-78 (July 9). 
 156. See infra notes 160-66 and accompanying text. 
 157. Hague Regulations, supra note 36, art. 43. 
 158. Id. art. 46 (confiscation of private property); Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 37, 
art. 47 (annexation, changes in government or institutions which violate Geneva protections), 
art. 49(6) (deportation or transfer of civilian population into occupied territory), art. 53 
(destruction of property).  See also Hague Regulations, supra note 36, art. 55 (requiring 
safeguard of certain state property). 
 159. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION 
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN A TIME OF WAR 275 (Jean S. Pictet 
ed., 1958) (stating that “the temporary nature of the occupier’s authority is what distinguishes 
occupation from annexation”). 
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territory when occupation ends.160  Changes in the status of occupied 
territory are valid only when agreed to by the legitimate 
representative of the occupied population.161  Recent U.N. Security 
Council resolutions acknowledge that occupation authority is 
temporary and limited by the ultimate political, economic and 
territorial rights of occupied populations.162 
The constraints resulting from the transience of occupation 
authority and the rights of occupied populations have been 
recognized by the Israeli Court.  The court observed that an occupier 
may not initiate far-reaching and long-term material changes in 
occupied territory, except for “the welfare of the local population”163 
and that lasting changes cannot be made to serve the occupier.164  In 
Beit Sourik, the court noted that its prior decisions “emphasized time 
and time again that the authority of the [occupier] is inherently 
temporary, as belligerent occupation is inherently temporary,” adding 
that the law of belligerent occupation leaves “no room” for lasting 
changes based on “political considerations, the annexation of 
territory, or the establishment of permanent borders of the state.”165  
Generalized national security interests are insufficient reason for long 
term changes.166 
Perhaps the strongest application of these Israeli judicial 
restrictions on occupation authority, and one that should prohibit any 
significant West Bank barrier incursion came in Dweikat v. 
Government of Israel (“Elon Moreh”).167  In Elon Moreh, the Israeli 
Court invalidated confiscation of Palestinian private property for a 
 
 160. Christopher Greenwood, The Administration of Occupied Territory in International 
Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 241, 
252 (Emma Playfair ed., 1972). 
 161. See id. at 244-45. 
 162. S.C. Res. 1483, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003); S.C. Res. 1511, para. 1, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (Oct. 16, 2003); S.C. Res. 1546, paras. 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 
8, 2004). 
 163. HCJ 351/80 Elec. Co. for Jerusalem Dist. v. Minister of Energy and Infrastructure 
[1980] IsrSC 35(2) 673, summarized in English in 11 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 354, 357; HCJ 393/82 
Jam’iyat Ascan v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria [1982] IsrSC 37(3) 785, 795, quoted in 
HCJ 2056/04, Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807 para. 27. 
 164. Beit Sourik [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807 para. 27 (quoting Jam’iyat Ascan [1982] IsrSC 37(3) 
785, at 795). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. HCJ 390/79 Dweikat v. Gov’t of Israel (Elon Moreh) [1980] IsrSC 34(1) 1, reprinted in 
19 I.L.M. 148 (1979) (unofficial Israeli Foreign Ministry translation) (subsequent citations to 
I.L.M. translation). 
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settlement that was permanent and built partly for political and 
religious motives.168  The court held that it was impermissible to build 
settlements in the territories for political reasons, religious reasons, or 
even general security reasons.169 
The Israeli Court categorically prohibited the government from 
intentionally creating lasting changes in the status of occupied 
territories for these reasons as “an insuperable obstacle” to legality 
“because the military government cannot create in its area facts for its 
military needs which are designed ab initio to exist even after the 
termination of military rule in that area, when the fate of the area 
after the termination of military rule is still not known.”170  This 
language from Elon Moreh must render illegal the creation of an 
integrated settlement infrastructure in occupied territory, consisting 
as it does of dozens of towns and roads all behind a fortified barrier 
that extends deeply into Palestine and runs the length of the territory.  
It is hard to imagine how taking years to build an impenetrable 720 
kilometer barrier around 300,000 people who consider themselves 
“settlers” and live in places called “settlements” is temporary enough 
to pass the Elon Moreh test. 
2. Israel’s Breach of Territorial Status Preservation Obligations.  
The following six points show that the barrier violates status 
preservation obligations because it is part of an ongoing 
comprehensive settlement program that illegally preserves Israeli 
possession of large portions of contested occupied territory. Israel has 
accelerated that program since Oslo began. 
First, there has been a large increase in Israeli settlers and 
settlements in the West Bank since the Oslo agreements took effect in 
1993.  Since the Oslo process began, the number of Israeli settlers in 
the occupied territories has grown by forty percent.171  Israeli West 
Bank housing units increased by over fifty percent since the Oslo 
process began.172  The displacement of tens of thousands of civilians 
into occupied territories violates international law,173 and this 
 
 168. Id. at 169, 171, 177. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 177; accord Elec. Co. [1980] IsrSC, 11 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. at 357. 
 171. Palestinian Statement, supra note 140, at 54; B’TSELEM, LAND GRAB: ISRAEL’S 
SETTLEMENT POLICY IN THE WEST BANK 8 (2002), available at http://www.btselem.org/ 
Download/200205_Land_Grab_Eng.pdf  (noting an increase from 247,000 to 375,000 settlers) 
[hereinafter B’tselem 2002 Report]. 
 172. B’tselem 2002 Report, supra note 171, at 16-17. 
 173. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 49(6). 
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displacement, along with the significant expansion of the number of 
settlements, is a change of status in violation of the peace agreements’ 
obligation to preserve the territorial status in the West Bank.174 
Second, the government is incentivizing illegal civilian 
displacement into settlements by investing in subsidization of 
settlements and settlers.  Israeli settler incentives include loans, 
discounted land, subsidized mortgages, free education, compensation 
incentives, business grants, and tax reductions.175  Israeli government 
funding of the settlements since 1967 has been estimated at $10 
billion.176  The barrier has cost $800 million and is projected to cost 
twice that to complete.177  Building the barrier on its West Bank route 
instead of the Green Line doubles its cost.178 
Third, Israeli law and administrative process sustains the 
settlement program.  Laws maintained after the Oslo process began 
curbing Palestinian development to preserve occupied territory for 
Israeli settlements; other laws have been interpreted to permit 
confiscation of land for settlements.179  In addition to making and 
interpreting laws to promote the settlement program, the Israeli 
government has broken its own laws to extend the program, 
expanding West Bank presence through illicit support of outposts 
that violate Israeli law.180 
Fourth, Israel expanded its West Bank bypass road network 
since the Oslo process began in 1993.  Because the roads link 
settlements to each other and Israel, and are largely inaccessible to 
 
 174. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text (status preservation obligations in 
agreements); 171-72 and accompanying text (expansion of settlements and displacement of 
civilians). 
 175. B’tselem 2002 Report, supra note 171, at 73-84; see also Press Release, Peace Now, 
Barak Renews Hi-Priority Status for Settlements (Dec. 30, 2000). 
 176. SHLOMO SWIRSKI, THE PRICE OF OCCUPATION: THE COST OF THE OCCUPATION TO 
ISRAELI SOCIETY, Executive Summary 7-8 (2004), available at http://www.adva.org/User 
Files/File/PRICEofOCCUPATION_exe.pdf. 
 177. Id. at 11; see also Rapporteur’s Report, supra note 3, para. 12. 
 178. SWIRSKI, supra note 176, at 11. 
 179. RAJA SHEHADEH, FROM OCCUPATION TO THE INTERIM ACCORDS: ISRAEL AND THE 
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 83-84 (1997), quoted in Palestinian Statement, 
supra note 140, para 155; see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human 
Rights, Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, including 
Palestine 18, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/121 (Mar. 16, 2001); B’tselem 2002 Report, supra note 171, 
at 59. 
 180. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Summary of the Opinion Concerning Unauthorized 
Outposts, Mar. 10, 2005, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/ 
Law/Legal+Issues+and+Rulings/Summary+of+Opinion+Concerning+Unauthorized+Outposts+
-+Talya+Sason+Adv.htm. 
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Palestinians, they facilitate Israeli transportation while blocking 
Palestinian movement.181  Forty percent of the four hundred kilometer 
West Bank road network was built after the Oslo process began.182  
The road network itself is a change in the status of the territories, and 
it assists and sustains the displacement of civilians into occupied 
territories in violation of Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. 
Fifth, the barrier entrenches Israeli possession of East 
Jerusalem.183  The barrier, along with practices and laws reserving 
property for Israelis while reducing property available for 
Palestinians and residency requirements excluding Palestinians, is 
squeezing Palestinians out of Jerusalem.184  The barrier impedes 
Jerusalemite Palestinians from leaving the city and West Bank 
Palestinians from entering.  It encircles over 200,000 Palestinians in 
East Jerusalem, isolating them from the West Bank and Palestinians 
there.185 
Sixth, Israeli government statements demonstrate that the 
barrier is meant to promote lasting Israeli possession of the settled 
territories.  Ariel Sharon, the Prime Minister who authorized the 
barrier and who was in office when the ICJ and Israeli Court issued 
their decisions, stated before the two court decisions that “it is clear 
that in the West Bank, there are areas which will be part of the State 
 
 181. B’tselem, Forbidden Roads—Israel’s Discriminatory Road Regime in the West Bank 5-6, 
36, Aug. 2004, available at http://www.btselem.org/download/200408_Forbidden_Roads_ 
Eng.pdf. 
 182. See Palestinian Statement, supra note 140, para. 151. 
 183. Israel placed East Jerusalem under Israeli law and considers it part of Israel rather than 
occupied territory subject to belligerent occupation law.  Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of 
Israel, 5740-1980, 34 LSI 209 (1980) (Isr.).  However, the argument that Jerusalem is not subject 
to the law against status change stands on shaky legal ground.  The Security Council does not 
recognize Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem, instead considering it occupied.  S.C. Res. 476 
(June 30, 1980); S.C. Res. 478 (Aug. 20, 1980). Even if belligerent occupation law is inapplicable, 
Jerusalem is reserved for permanent status negotiations under Oslo agreements and the 
Roadmap, supra note 104, at 7, and therefore unilateral action by Israel to take portions of 
Jerusalem violate a central purpose of the peace agreements, which is to resolve territorial 
disputes through negotiation rather than by force.  Moreover, the agreements contemplate 
Palestinian sovereignty in parts of Jerusalem, calling for Palestinian voting in Jerusalem and 
reopening of Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem. 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 103, art. 
II(3); Roadmap, supra note 104, at 4. 
 184. B’tselem 2002 Report, supra note 171, at 62, 87-88, 102-04. 
 185. Danny Rubenstein, Battle for the Capital, HAARETZ (Isr.), Mar. 31, 2005; Amira Hess, 
Separating J’lem 
from the ‘West Bank’, HAARETZ (Isr.), Jan. 26, 2005; The Association for Civil Rights in Israel 
(ACRI), Separation Barrier Route Violates International Law, http://www.acri.org.il/english-
acri/engine/story.asp?id=210 (last visited Mar. 22, 2007). 
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of Israel, including major Israeli population centers, cities, towns and 
villages, security areas and other places of special interest to Israel.”186  
After the decisions Prime Minister Sharon reaffirmed Israel’s intent 
to retain large amounts of settled territory by stating the settlement of 
Ariel, deep in the West Bank, “will forever be part of the State of 
Israel” and that Ariel and other settlements will remain an 
“inseparable part of the State of Israel, technically contiguous with 
the State of Israel.”187 
Israeli government statements link the barrier to intent to keep 
the settlements.188  The government stated in post-Beit Sourik court 
proceedings that the barrier is in the West Bank to protect 
settlements and bypass roads,189 conceded that the reasons for the 
barrier include non-security related political considerations and the 
desire to keep land for Israeli industrial expansion, and maintained 
that the barrier is too difficult to move.190  A government minister 
acknowledged a demographic motivation, stating that the barrier is 
intended to insure a Jewish majority in Jerusalem.191 
 
 186. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Cabinet Resolution Regarding the 
Disengagement Plan, June 6, 2004, available at http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+ 
Process/Reference+Documents/Revised+Disengagement+Plan+6-June-2004.htm. 
 187. Aluf Benn, PM: Ariel Will Forever be an Integral Part of Israel, HAARETZ (Isr.), July 
22, 2005.  Prime Minister Sharon delayed providing requested outlines of settlement boundaries 
in order to allow the settlements to expand to the point where they would be difficult to uproot.  
He admitted that he delayed “in the hope that by the time the discussion of the settlement blocs 
comes . . . these blocs will contain a very large number of settlements and residents.”  Shahor 
Ilan, Sharon Against the Haters from Tel Aviv, HAARETZ (Isr.), Aug. 25, 2005.  The current 
Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, stated that if negotiations are unsuccessful or impossible, 
Israel will retain settlements in the occupied territories that are part of “major Israeli population 
centers” in what he described as “part of the State of Israel as part of a final status agreement.”  
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Statement Following Meeting with President Bush, May 24, 2006, 
http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/PMSpeaks/Speechusapress240506.htm.  
Regardless of the legality of this position, it does violence to the plain meaning of the word 
“agreement.”  Taking land is not part of a bilateral agreement if it is done unilaterally because 
an agreement cannot be reached. 
 188. Post-decision statements are pertinent to future cases rather than to critiques of the two 
decisions.  However, the position of the Israeli government that Israeli possession of large 
portions of the settlements is intended to last indefinitely, and that the barrier is intended in 
part to preserve Israeli possession of settled territory, invite reconsideration of the decisions to 
the extent the decisions were based on Israeli representations, now abandoned, that the barrier 
was solely a temporary security measure and not a territorial boundary. 
 189. See B’TSELEM, BEHIND THE BARRIER: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AS A RESULT OF 
ISRAEL’S SEPARATION BARRIER 29 (2003), available at http://www.btselem.org/Download/ 
200304_Behind_The_Barrier_Eng.pdf [hereinafter B’tselem Barrier Report]. 
 190. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 191. Id. 
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The Israeli expansion of its settlement program, including its 
preservation by the barrier, violates the prohibition of territorial 
status change under the peace agreements and international law.  
Under the agreements, Israel cannot change the status of the 
territories so as to prejudge negotiations on their disposition.192  The 
law of belligerent occupation imposes similar restrictions.193  Israeli 
Court interpretations of belligerent occupation law prohibit non-
temporary measures taken for reasons unrelated to the interests of 
Palestinians and disallow lasting changes that benefit Israel.194  These 
Israeli precedents prohibit changes for Israeli political, economic, or 
territorial advantage.195 
The Israeli West Bank settlement program since 1993 thoroughly 
violates these principles.  The settlement program and the barrier 
preserving it constitute a deliberately comprehensive physical, 
institutional, and demographic change in the status of the West Bank 
intended to create a political reality too difficult to reverse: lasting 
Israeli possession of contested territory—subject by agreement to 
negotiation—to the exclusion of Palestinian rights, interests, and 
people.196  Under the peace agreements and the law of belligerent 
occupation, this is illegal. 
3. Judicial Neglect of Status Preservation Obligations.  Neither 
court considered the implications of status preservation obligations 
under the peace agreements and the law of belligerent occupation.  In 
fact, both courts entirely ignored what the agreements require. 
The Israeli Court referred to belligerent occupation law 
restrictions, but did not follow them to their logical conclusion—a 
holding that the barrier is impermissible because it is part of an 
ongoing lasting change in status that illegally perpetuates Israeli 
possession over contested territory.  Instead, the court accepted 
without meaningful factual examination the government’s 
representation that the barrier is a temporary security measure, 
rather than a lasting political means to the permanent political end of 
controlling territory.197  In so doing, the Israeli Court ignored 
 
 192. See supra Parts III.A.2.a., III.B.1.a. 
 193. See supra Part III.B.1.b. 
 194. See supra notes 163-70 and accompanying text. 
 195. See supra notes 163-70 and accompanying text. 
 196. See supra notes 68, 171-91 and accompanying text. 
 197. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807 paras. 28-30.  
In view of the court’s uncritical acceptance of governmental claims that the barrier is a 
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overwhelming factual evidence that the barrier is part of a settlement 
policy which violates its principles on occupation authority.198  In this 
regard, Beit Sourik continues the Israeli Court’s longstanding failure 
to rule on the legality of the Israeli settlement policy, a failure which 
rests the court’s settlement rulings on what has been rightly called a 
“dubious assumption of legality.”199 
The ICJ also neglected to fully consider status preservation 
obligations, although it did consider some provisions from the law of 
belligerent occupation and found violation of several.200  While this is 
preferable to the Israeli Court’s complete failure to consider these 
principles, the ICJ analysis is nonetheless legally and factually 
incomplete.  The precision and reasoning of the Advisory Opinion 
would have been significantly sharpened had the court properly 
 
temporary security measure, praise of Beit Sourik as a more intricate and rigorous analysis than 
the Advisory Opinion seems undeserved.  See, e.g., Watson, supra note 7, at 24-25; Shany, supra 
note 8, at 233.  The court’s detailed concern with Palestinian suffering is noteworthy.  However, 
the Israeli Court did not pursue the same sort of careful factual examination of the barrier’s 
impact on the status of the territories that should have followed from the court’s stated 
restrictions on occupation authority.  While perhaps the Israeli Court was more detailed in what 
it did analyze, the problem is what it did not analyze.  As recognized by a commentator 
generally supportive of Beit Sourik as the better reasoned decision, Beit Sourik was not a 
“[c]omprehensive legal analysis” because it did not address the illegality of West Bank 
settlements and ignored that the barrier route was primarily dictated by the settlements.  Shany, 
supra note 8, at 233, 243-44.  The Israeli Court’s Mara’abe decision replicates the superficiality 
of its Beit Sourik treatment of the purpose and duration of the barrier, again accepting without 
meaningful analysis the government’s position that the barrier was solely intended for security 
and that it was temporary.  In fact, at one point the court supported its conclusion that the 
barrier was “inherently temporary” by stating that orders to seize land from Palestinians for the 
barrier were “limited to a definite period of a few years.”  HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. Prime 
Minister of Israel [2005] IsrSC 38(2) 393 para. 100.  Government confiscation of a person’s land 
and property for “a few years” and destruction of homes on such  property to build a security 
barrier are not “inherently temporary” measures.  A few years is a long time, recovering 
property taken by the government is difficult, and rebuilding a home on that property—even if 
it could be recovered from the Israeli government—is arduous.  It would be enormously time 
consuming for a Palestinian whose land is confiscated to get the land back and undo the 
destruction of his or her home.  Further, the Israeli Court’s assumption that confiscation for a “a 
few years” is “inherently temporary” is strikingly blithe in view of the fact that the confiscation 
is at the hands of the same government which, prior to the confiscation of Palestinian property 
individually, has already occupied Palestinian territory generally for almost forty years. 
 198. It has been noted by at least one experienced observer of the Israeli Court that the 
Court has selectively applied occupation law.  See KRETZMER, supra note 11, at 99 (observing 
that Elon Moreh, which bars creation of facts which effect lasting changes in occupied 
territories, has not been more broadly applied to block expropriation of land for settlements or 
roads). 
 199. Id.; see also Shany, supra note 8, at 244. 
 200. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 paras. 115-22, 132, 134; id. paras. 24-25 (separate 
opinion of Judge Higgins). 
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found that the barrier violates the agreements’ specific prohibitions of 
status change in contested territories and connected this to the broad 
prohibition of status change that stands at the center of belligerent 
occupation law. 
To be sure, such an analysis would have led the ICJ to the same 
conclusion on the barrier’s illegality.  However, an agreement-based 
change of status analysis improves the reasoning in several respects, 
one being that it avoids the speculation in the ICJ findings.  The ICJ 
discussion of annexation and self-determination in its treatment of 
the barrier’s illegality was based on the possibility that the barrier 
might lead to annexation and that this in turn could impede 
Palestinian self-determination.201  Annexation requires some 
demonstration of formality or permanence; absent such evidence the 
ICJ slipped into a speculative discussion of whether the barrier “could 
well become permanent, in which case . . . it would be tantamount to 
de facto annexation.”202  It is significant that the court ruled that a 
barrier intended as a security measure against actual lethal attacks is 
illegal because of potential annexation. 
The ICJ’s decision that the barrier is illegal because it impedes 
Palestinian self-determination is also problematically speculative.  
The existence of the right is clear under international law,203 but its 
geographic scope as to Palestine is less certain as it is subject to 
negotiation under the agreements.  Moreover, one of the greatest 
obstacles to Palestinian self-determination is Palestinian terrorism.  
For those reasons, two ICJ judges were doubtful of a causal nexus 
between the barrier and frustration of self-determination.204  These 
difficulties of proof, along with limited evidence, led the ICJ to a 
murky, unsatisfactorily explained conclusion that the barrier impedes 
self-determination based on potential annexation.  The weakness of 
the ICJ analysis on this and other issues has been cited by both 
supporters and critics of the Opinion who have observed that its 
credibility is undermined by shallow reasoning.205 
 
 201. Id. paras. 121-22. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. para. 88; U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights art. 1.1, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights art. 1.1, Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 204. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, paras. 28-31 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins); id. 
paras. 6, 32 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans). 
 205. Id. paras. 28-31 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins) (questioning the court’s self-
determination analysis).  For other criticisms of the court’s reasoning see id. paras. 3-5, 7 
(declaration of Judge Buergenthal); Watson, supra note 7, at 25; Iain Scobbie, Words My 
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A change-of-status analysis under the agreements and belligerent 
occupation law provides greater clarity and more comprehensive 
consideration of law and facts.  The existence of an Israeli status 
preservation obligation is clear from the peace agreements, 
international law, and the principles established by the Israeli 
Court.206  In the agreements, Israel accepts that the general 
prohibition of status change applies specifically to contested West 
Bank territory,207 and in its decisions, the Israeli Court does as well.208 
Breach of the status preservation obligation is more easily 
proven than annexation or impediment to self-determination.  
Proving status change does not require evidence of official formalities 
of annexation.  Nor is there need for speculation on whether there 
might be a status change in the future because there have already 
been enormous lasting physical changes in the status of the settled 
territories.209  This would be a factual, evidentiary examination, not 
guesswork on the future scope of Palestinian self-determination, the 
reasons that right has not been realized, or the possibility of 
annexation.  To the extent the analysis requires assessment of 
whether the changes will last, this again is a matter of fact not 
speculation.  The changes will be lasting because they have lasted, 
and that is because they were intended and designed to be lasting, as 
demonstrated by the sheer physical scope of the settlement 
infrastructure and government statements regarding its purpose.210  A 
holding that the barrier and settlements violate Israeli legal 
obligations not to change the status of the territories would be based 
on legal commitments that cannot be contested and factual evidence 
that cannot be controverted. 
This discussion leads to another advantage of an agreement-
based change-of-status analysis—it allows (indeed requires) more 
comprehensive consideration of facts pertinent to the barrier.  The 
ICJ, though it considered population transfer and property issues, did 
not fully consider the barrier as part of a multifaceted settlement 
 
Mother Never Taught Me: In Defence of the International Court, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 76, 80 (2005); 
Kretzmer, supra note 12, 88-89, 101-02; Ardi Imseis, Critical Reflections on the International 
Humanitarian Law Aspects of the ICJ “Wall” Advisory Opinion, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 102, 103-04, 
109, 114 (2005); but see Falk, supra note 28, at 42, 49-50 (praising the Opinion’s persuasiveness 
and clarity). 
 206. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 207. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text. 
 208. See supra notes 163-70 and accompanying text. 
 209. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 210. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
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policy.  The relation of the barrier to bypass roads, to the legal and 
administrative framework for the settlements, to possession of 
Jerusalem, to financial incentives, and to evidence of government 
intention to perpetuate the settlements was largely unexamined. 
Also neglected was the question of timing.  Specifically, there 
was no factual consideration of the fact that, after the Oslo process 
began in 1993, Israel expanded and perpetuated of the settlement 
program at the same time as it entered agreements that repeatedly 
and clearly required exactly the opposite—Israel agreed to leave the 
status of the occupied territories unchanged to permit negotiations as 
to their ultimate disposition, yet simultaneously made enormous 
physical and institutional changes in the territories which effectively 
predetermine the outcome of virtually all of the territorial issues 
which are reserved for final status talks.  The status preservation 
provisions in the agreements are an independent source of Israeli 
legal obligation.  The ICJ, by ignoring them, failed to cite a critical 
Israeli violation of law that is directly relevant to the barrier and also 
undermines the prospects of peaceful resolution of the entire 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict. 
Failure to consider the relevant legal principles and engage in a 
full factual examination led both courts to give unwarranted credence 
to Israeli claims that the barrier is a temporary security measure, 
when the facts overwhelmingly demonstrate that it is part of a 
politically motivated settlement program that is meant to last.  A 
proper analysis would have dispensed with the fiction that the 
settlements and the barrier are temporary.  Such a finding is also a 
critical component in properly defining Israel’s right to self-defense, 
as will be explained infra in Section D. 
C. Palestinian Breach of Anti-Terrorism Obligations 
Oslo and the Roadmap do not pave a one-way street to peace.  
Full review of the barrier requires examination of Palestinian 
noncompliance with anti-terrorism obligations.  As was the case with 
Israeli territorial status preservation requirements, Palestine has 
breached the duty to end terrorism that it accepted in the agreements 
and that mirrors well-established international law. 
1. Legal Sources of Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Obligations 
a. Anti-Terrorism Obligations in the Agreements.  In the Oslo 
agreements and the Roadmap, Palestine accepted comprehensive 
counterterrorism responsibilities that effectively require it to end all 
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terrorism against Israelis emanating from Palestinian sources.211  The 
Palestinian government agreed not to use terror,212 to prevent and 
respond to terrorism, to eliminate terror cells, and to stop financial 
and logistical support of terrorists.213  The Palestinian Authority 
committed to law enforcement anti-terrorism measures, including 
arrest and prosecution of suspects and seizure of illegal weapons.214  
Palestine recognized that anti-terror protection extended to all Israeli 
civilians everywhere, including residents of the West Bank.215  
Palestine’s anti-terror obligations include the prohibition of 
incitement to, or encouragement of, terror.216 
b. Anti-Terrorism Obligations Under International Law.  
Terrorism violates the core principle of international humanitarian 
law—protection of civilians against violence.  Geneva Convention 
Common Article 3 requires humane treatment of civilians and 
prohibits “violence to life,” murder, and cruel treatment.217  Common 
Article 3 applies to Israeli settlers because it protects civilians “at any 
time and in any place.”218 
Article 51(2) of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions directly 
prohibits attacks and terror against civilians: “The civilian population 
as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the subject of 
attack.  Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to 
spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.”219 
The ICJ described protection of civilians as an “intransgressible” 
rule of customary international law.220 
 
 211. See supra notes 117-28 and accompanying text. 
 212. See supra notes 117 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra notes 118, 120, 125, 128 and accompanying text. 
 214. See supra notes 120, 122-24 and accompanying text. 
 215. See supra notes 118-19, 125-26 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 217. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 3. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 51(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
Protocol I]; see also id. art. 52(1) (“[C]ivilian objects shall not be the object of attacks or 
reprisals.”).  Article 48 requires distinction between civilians and combatants.  Id. art. 48.  The 
principles of distinction and protection of civilians in Articles 48, 51, and 52 of Protocol I reflect 
customary international law.  1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L 
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 8, 25 (2005). 
 220. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, 257 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]. 
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These laws apply to Palestine.  Common Article 3 applies to non-
state actors and covers the Palestinian Authority and Palestinian 
terrorist organizations.221  Similarly, the protection of civilians 
required by Protocol I apply to non-state parties in all armed 
conflicts.  The provisions protect civilians regardless of the nature or 
origins of the conflict or the causes espoused by the parties, and 
expressly apply to those fighting against occupation or for self-
determination.222  Palestine agreed to adhere to the Geneva 
Conventions and Protocols in 1989.223  Palestine reaffirmed this 
commitment in agreeing to follow “internationally-accepted norms 
and principles of human rights and the rule of law” in the 1995 
Interim Agreement.224 
Security Council resolutions reinforce Palestine’s anti-terrorism 
duties.  Resolution 1373 requires anti-terrorism measures similar to 
those in the agreements.225  Subsequent resolutions confirm that 
resolution 1373 applies to non-state actors226 and that civilians are 
protected regardless of location.227 
Resolutions 1456 and 1566 make clear that the duty to prevent 
terrorism applies without exception for transnational status or 
motivation: 
[T]errorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of 
the most serious threats to peace and security; 
[A]ny acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of 
their motivation, whenever and by whomsoever committed and are 
to be unequivocally condemned, 
.  .  .  . 
All states must take urgent action to prevent and suppress all active 
and passive support to terrorism . . . .228 
 
 221. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 3; Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U. S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 114 (June 27) [hereinafter 
Nicaragua]. 
 222. Protocol I, supra note 218, art. 1(4). 
 223. Letter from Permanent Mission of Palestine to U.N. Office (June 21, 1989), quoted in 
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 362 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000). 
 224. 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 103, art. XIX. 
 225. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 41, ¶¶ 1-3. 
 226. S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004) (including non-state actors 
among those to whom resolution 1373 applies). 
 227. S.C. Res. 1566, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004) (calling for counterterrorism 
cooperation with “states where or against whose citizens terrorist acts are committed”). 
 228. S.C. Res. 1456, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (Jan. 20, 2003); S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 227 
(restating the first two of the three quoted passages). 
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This language rules out argument that terrorism for certain purposes, 
or within certain geographic boundaries, escapes legal prohibition. 
2. Palestinian Failure to Meet Anti-Terrorism Obligations.  Just 
as Israel breached its obligation to preserve the status of the occupied 
territories, Palestine violated its duty to end terrorism during the 
period leading to the building of the barrier.  There was a dramatic 
increase in Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians from 
September 2000 through April 2002.229  One human rights 
organization reported that during this time “armed Palestinian groups 
mounted the deadliest series of attacks against Israeli civilians in 
decades.”230  From September 2000-2002, more than 415 Israelis were 
killed and over two thousand were injured by Palestinian terrorists.231  
In March 2002, immediately before Israel approved the barrier, 37 
terrorist attacks killed 135 Israeli civilians and injured 721.232  The 
intensified campaign of Palestinian terrorism continued through the 
courts’ consideration of the barrier’s legality, as terrorists killed over 
nine hundred civilians and injured over five thousand from 
September 2000 through January 2004.233  Four Palestinian groups—al 
Aqsa, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine—claimed responsibility for the attacks.234 
The attacks constitute Palestinian non-compliance with anti-
terrorism obligations, regardless of Palestinian Authority complicity, 
because Palestine was required to prevent terrorist attacks and 
agreed to their immediate and unconditional halt.235  The frequency 
and consequences of the attacks demonstrate that the Authority was 
unable or unwilling to meet these obligations.236 
 
 229. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2003, at 459 (2003), available at 
http://hrw.org/wr2k3/ [hereinafter HRW WORLD REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PATTERNS 
OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2002, at 56 (2003), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2002/ 
[hereinafter STATE DEPARTMENT 2002]; see Israeli Statement, supra note 13, at 41. 
 230. HRW WORLD REPORT, supra note 229, at 465. 
 231. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ERASED IN A MOMENT: SUICIDE BOMBING ATTACKS 
AGAINST 
ISRAELI CITIZENS 1 (2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/isrl-pa/ [hereinafter 
HRW TERRORISM REPORT]. 
 232. Israeli Statement, supra note 13, at 45. 
 233. Id. at i. 
 234. STATE DEPARTMENT 2002, supra note 229, at 56; HRW TERRORISM REPORT, supra 
note 231, at 1-2; HRW WORLD REPORT, supra note 229, at 465. 
 235. See supra notes 118, 120-21, 124-25 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra notes 229-34 and accompanying text. 
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The evidence goes beyond Authority incapacity to prevent 
terrorism.  The Authority, with approval of its president, paid al-Aqsa 
members, including those planning attacks.237  This violates 
Palestinian duties to stop financial and logistical support for terrorist 
groups. 
Palestinian Authority anti-terrorism efforts were minimal and 
ineffective from 2002-2004, the critical period during which Israel 
decided to build the barrier.238  Human Rights Watch criticized the 
Authority’s failure to move decisively against terrorism239 and 
attributed responsibility for attacks to the Authority because of its 
deliberate, politically motivated, lax anti-terror action: “there are 
important steps . . . the [Palestinian Authority] could and should have 
taken to prevent or deter suicide bombings directed against civilians.  
The failure to take those steps implies a high degree of responsibility 
for what occurred.”240 
Palestine “routinely failed to investigate, arrest, and prosecute” 
those involved in terrorism (including Authority personnel) and 
released suspects without investigation.241 While it has been observed 
that Israeli military action “degraded” Palestinian law enforcement 
capabilities,242 Palestine failed to take effective action to prevent 
terrorism when its security capacity was intact.243  Further, the 
Authority not only failed to seize illegal weapons that could be used 
by terrorists, as it agreed to do, but was actually caught importing 
illegal weapons in January 2002.244  The Palestinian Authority also 
failed to prevent incitement.  Through 2002, Authority and Fatah 
officials praised, promoted, and justified attacks, as did Authority-run 
media, without effective response.245 
 
 237. STATE DEPARTMENT 2002, supra note 229, at 56; HRW TERRORISM REPORT, supra 
note 231, at 2-3, 125-26, 132. 
 238. STATE DEPARTMENT 2002, supra note 229, at 56; U.S. DEP’T OF  STATE, PATTERNS OF 
GLOBAL TERRORISM 2003 62 (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
31912.pdf; HRW TERRORISM REPORT, supra note 231, at 3. 
 239. HRW WORLD REPORT, supra note 229, at 465-66; HRW TERRORISM REPORT, supra 
note 231, at 2-3. 
 240. HRW TERRORISM REPORT, supra note 231, at 3; see also id. at 109 (political 
motivation for Authority inaction). 
 241. Id. at 3. 
 242. STATE DEPARTMENT 2002, supra note 229, at 56. 
 243. HRW TERRORISM REPORT, supra note 231, at 3 n.239. 
 244. STATE DEPARTMENT 2002, supra note 229, at 56. 
 245. Id. 
02__MARTEL.DOC 10/4/2007  9:51:58 AM 
344 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 17:305 
The Palestinian Authority was cited by an independent human 
rights group with treating prevention of terrorism as “negotiable and 
contingent” rather than “the unconditional obligation that it was.”246  
Human Rights Watch charged the Authority with creating a “culture 
of impunity” and considered the Authority politically responsible for 
terrorism.247  Another humanitarian organization described 
“[g]rowing Palestinian [l]awlessness” and reported that the Authority 
“failed to defend civilians and to stop the violent actions of the 
extremist groups.”248  Palestinian failure to stop terrorism is as 
deliberate and comprehensive a violation of peace agreements and 
international law as the Israeli settlement policy and is obviously and 
tragically a cause for the barrier and continued conflict. 
3. Judicial Neglect of Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Obligations.  
As one experienced Middle East negotiator observed, “in the absence 
of terror, there would be no need for a security barrier.”249  However, 
neither court analyzed the Palestinian duty to stop terrorism.  Instead, 
both courts made passing reference to terrorism en route to 
dramatically different conclusions on Israeli defense rights. 
As to Beit Sourik, this is less troublesome.  Had the Israeli Court 
reached the result argued for here—that any West Bank barrier route 
is illegal—holdings on Palestinian obligation would be necessary for a 
legally complete, politically viable decision in which the barrier’s 
illegality would be part of a ruling requiring reciprocal compliance 
with peace agreements.  However, since Beit Sourik authorizes 
barrier routes in occupied Palestine, it is probably best that it did not 
include a potentially provocative examination of the Authority’s legal 
responsibility for Palestinian terrorism.  Israeli judicial approval of an 
Israeli barrier in the West Bank, coupled with a ruling that 
Palestinian terrorism violated peace agreements and international 
law, would have made for imbalanced law and volatile politics. 
ICJ neglect of Palestinian anti-terrorism obligations is a different 
matter.  Coupled with the court’s dismissal of Israeli self-defense 
rights, this led to a gravely flawed legal analysis with serious political 
 
 246. HRW TERRORISM REPORT, supra note 231, at 3. 
 247. HRW WORLD REPORT, supra note 229, at 465. 
 248. OXFAM INTERNATIONAL BRIEFING PAPER, PROTECTING CIVILIANS: A 
CORNERSTONE OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE 2, 6 (May 2004), available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/ 
what_we_do/issues/conflict_disasters/bp62_prot_civil.htm [hereinafter OXFAM REPORT]. 
 249. See Ruth Wedgewood, The Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Security Fence and the 
Limits of Self-Defense, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 54  n.13 (2005). 
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consequences.  The ICJ ignored the fact that terrorism is a cause for 
the barrier and ignored the law that terrorism is a breach of 
Palestinian legal obligation.  As a result, the Advisory Opinion was a 
one-sided assessment of Israeli responsibility criticized by one ICJ 
judge as premised on a “huge imbalance.”250 
Again, neglect of the issue is perplexing because evidence and 
argument on terrorism were presented to the ICJ.  Israel urged the 
ICJ to look beyond the General Assembly’s request for an opinion, 
which made no mention of terrorism, to wider issues relevant to the 
barrier and stated it was “inconceivable” to ignore the implications of 
terrorism.251  Though it declined to contest the merits, Israel presented 
the ICJ with detailed examination of Palestinian anti-terrorism 
obligations, and their breach.252 
Moreover, the issue was surely considered in pre-decision 
deliberations.  Four judges criticized the court’s slight factual 
examination of terrorism and neglect of its legal implications,253 
including Judge Higgins, who critiqued the court’s one-sided view of 
legal obligation: “[The barrier dispute] cannot be regarded as one in 
which one party alone [is] the legal wrongdoer; where it is for it alone 
to act to restore a situation of legality; and where from the 
perspective of legal obligation there is nothing remaining for the 
other “party” to do.”254  She criticized the court for not applying 
humanitarian law protecting civilians to Palestine: 
[T]he Court should also have taken the opportunity to say, in the 
clearest terms, what regrettably today apparently needs constant 
reaffirmation even among international lawyers, namely, that the 
protection of civilians remains an intransgressible obligation of 
humanitarian law, not only for the occupier but equally for those 
seeking to liberate themselves from occupation.255 
Commentators have also criticized the Advisory Opinion for an 
imbalanced assessment of fact and legal obligation which neglects 
Palestinian responsibility for terrorism.256 
 
 250. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 18 (July 9) (separate opinion of Judge Higgins). 
 251. Israeli Statement, supra note 13, at 50. 
 252. Id. at i-ii, 20-33, 40-54. 
 253. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 3 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal); id. paras. 
5, 13 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans); id. paras. 22-23, 25-27, 30-31 (separate opinion of 
Judge Owada); id. paras. 3, 15-16, 18, 31 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins). 
 254. Id. para. 3 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins). 
 255. Id. para. 19 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins) (emphasis added). 
 256. See Wedgewood, supra note 249, at 52, 59, 61; Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the 
Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the ICJ?, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 62, 71 (2005). 
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On the ICJ, Judges Kooijmans, Owada, and Higgins expressed 
concern with the political consequences of the Opinion’s slant and 
would have preferred a more balanced analysis.257  Judges Owada and 
Higgins called for consideration of peace agreements, with Judge 
Owada observing that the “twin principles” of peace—Israeli military 
withdrawal from the territories and an end to belligerency—imposed 
obligations on both sides.258  Judge Higgins thought that rulings on 
bilateral obligations should have been part of the dispositif, to inform 
“both parties not only of their substantive obligations under 
international law, but also of the procedural obligation to move 
forward simultaneously.”259 
The judges’ admonitions were predictive.  The imbalanced ICJ 
Opinion tipped politics away from enforcement of Palestinian 
responsibility.  Palestinian and international reaction reflects the 
Opinion’s incorrect perspective that the law is on the Palestinian side, 
with resulting political pressure falling only upon Israel.260  Also, as 
demonstrated by Israeli government statements and the Mara’abe 
decision, ICJ neglect of terrorism and dismissal of Israeli security 
gave the Israeli government a rationale for disregarding the Advisory 
Opinion.261 
 The legal and political benefits of considering Palestinian 
obligations in the peace agreements mirror those of considering 
Israeli obligations.  Decisions neglecting Palestinian obligations are 
legally and factually incomplete because they ignore that illegal 
Palestinian terrorism is a reason for the barrier.  An agreement-based 
analysis requiring Palestinian compliance with anti-terror duties 
would properly lay legal responsibility for the barrier (and for 
complying with agreements to end the larger conflict) on both sides of 
the barrier. 
An agreement-based ruling would also more accurately 
recognize and appropriate third-party responsibilities for illegalities 
that led to the barrier.  The ICJ issued a one-way holding on this 
issue, admonishing third-party states not to support or contribute to 
 
 257. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 13 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans); id. 
paras. 3, 17-19 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins); id. paras. 28, 31 (separate opinion of Judge 
Owada). 
 258. Id. paras. 28, 31 (separate opinion of Judge Owada). 
 259. Id. para. 18 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins). 
 260. See supra notes 49, 53-56 and accompanying text. 
 261. See Israel Ministry of Defense, supra note 60; HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. Prime Minister 
of Israel [2005] IsrSC 38(2) 393 paras. 59-74. 
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Israeli construction of the barrier (and by strong implication not to 
aid the larger settlement project of which the barrier is part).262  Here 
again, the agreements impose more even-handed bilateral restrictions 
that are more politically realistic than the ICJ’s, because they extend 
third-party responsibility to prohibit support of Palestinian terrorism.  
Specifically, the Roadmap demands an end to outside funding and 
support of terrorism and reflects similar requirements under existing 
international agreements.263  Accordingly, a proper barrier decision 
would require that third parties not support Palestinian terrorism 
because such terrorism—along with outside support for it⎯is one 
cause for the barrier.  Prohibiting third party support for the Israeli 
barrier and the Palestinian terror that led to it would reach all causes 
for the barrier because it would place political pressure from the 
decision on Israel, Palestine, and third-party supporters of both to 
stop conduct which has perpetuated the conflict, violated the peace 
agreements, and resulted in the barrier. 
Attention to anti-terror duties would also have the benefit of 
confronting Palestine with the political reality that achieving and 
maintaining statehood requires ending terrorism.  It is unimaginable 
that terrorism, and the distinctions relied on by the Authority to 
disclaim responsibility for violence, would be tolerated if carried out 
by an independent state.  In fact, post-independence terrorism would 
provide opponents of Palestinian statehood with the strongest 
possible argument to curb or end Palestinian independence.264 
Finally, appropriate consideration of illegal terrorism as a reason 
for the barrier is part of a proper analysis of Israel’s right to self-
defense.  The Article will address that issue next. 
D. The Israeli Right to Self-Defense 
Each court erred on Israeli defense rights: the ICJ in dismissing 
them and the Israeli Court in extending them too far.  International 
law and the agreements point to a more sensible conclusion—
 
 262. See AdvisoryOpinon, 2004 I.C.J. 131 paras. 139, 149, 151-53, 159, 162.  The ICJ, in 
warning third parties against aiding the “situation” resulting from the barrier suggests a ban on 
third-party support of Israeli activities that extends well beyond prohibiting assistance to 
construction of the barrier. 
 263. See Roadmap, supra note 104, at 4; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 41; Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 
14 at 114-15 (June 27) (state duty not to support or encourage violations of Common Article 3). 
 264. The Authority’s self-distancing from responsibility for terrorist groups collides with 
reality for another reason.  Now that Hamas has won control of the legislature and is part of the 
Palestinian Authority government, terrorism participated in, encouraged, or permitted by 
Hamas is directly attributable to the Authority. 
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recognition of an Israeli self-defense right, properly confined by the 
principle of proportionality, that does not perpetuate or exacerbate 
the illegal settlement program. 
1. Self-Defense in the Decisions.  The ICJ dispensed with Israeli 
self-defense in six sentences.  The court provided two reasons for its 
holding.265  First, after quoting Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which 
does not limit the right of self-defense to state attacks,266 the court 
concluded that Article 51 does limit self-defense to state attacks and 
wrongly added that “Israel does not claim that the attacks against it 
are imputable to a foreign State.”267  Second, the court held that the 
Security Council counterterrorism resolutions could not be invoked 
by Israel because the attacks come from within occupied territory 
under Israeli control.268  This would wrongly disallow Israeli defense 
against non-state terrorism and attacks from occupied territory. 
While Beit Sourik did not reference self-defense under 
international law, the Israeli Court applied self-defense limiting 
principles in examining whether the barrier was proportional.269  
However, the court’s failure to consider implications of the illegality 
of the settlement program and its truncated segment-by-segment 
analysis of the barrier led to a flawed proportionality holding that 
wrongly allows a barrier preserving Israeli possession of contested 
territory.270 
 
 265. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 139. 
 266. Article 51 reads: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.  Measures taken by members in the exercise of this 
right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall 
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the 
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. 
The plain language of Article 51 does not limit the right of self-defense to armed attacks by 
states.  U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 267. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 139.  On the contrary, in its submission to the 
ICJ, Israel attributed terrorist complicity to Syria, Lebanon, and Iran.  Israeli Statement, supra 
note 13, at 44.  Non-governmental organizations have reached similar conclusions.  HRW 
TERRORISM REPORT, supra note 231, at 99-100. 
 268. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 139. 
 269. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807 paras. 34-85. 
 270. See infra notes 309-15 and accompanying text. 
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2. A Proper Self-Defense Analysis and the Agreements 
a. Israel’s Right to Self-Defense 
i. Self-Defense Under International Law.  Although the peace 
agreements recognize and help define Israel’s right to self-defense, its 
source is the inherent right of self-defense recognized in the U.N. 
Charter.  The text of Article 51 of the Charter does not confine self-
defense to attacks from states, and thus permits response to non-state 
terrorism.271  Further, the inherent right adopted in the Charter 
preserves customary international law, which allows self-defense 
against non-state attacks.272 
U.N. Security Council resolutions confirm this reading of the law.  
Resolutions 1368 and 1373 recognize the right to self-defense in 
response to non-state terrorist attacks.273  Resolution 1540 expressly 
states that “non-state actors” are among “those to whom resolution 
1373 applies.”274  The ICJ incorrectly dismissed Israel’s right to defend 
against non-state attacks, as Article 51, U.N. Security Council 
resolutions, and customary international law all permit self-defense 
against armed attack from non-state entities. 
The ICJ’s rejection of self-defense against terrorist attacks from 
occupied or controlled territories is also contrary to international 
law.275  There is no language in Article 51 or UN Security Council 
resolutions establishing this exclusion.  To the contrary, the 
resolutions call for comprehensive counterterrorism measures to 
“prevent and suppress . . . any acts of terrorism” without exception.276 
 
 271. Supra note 266 and accompanying text; Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 33 
(separate opinion of Judge Higgins); id. para. 6 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal); Murphy, 
supra note 256, at 64; Wedgewood, supra note 249, at 58-59. 
 272. Murphy, supra note 256, at 64-65.  A seminal expression of the right of self-defense 
came in the 1837 Caroline incident.  Caroline concerned use of force in response to attacks from 
non-state entities, specifically the United Kingdom’s defense against U.S. nationals who were 
supporting a rebellion against the United Kingdom’s government in Canada.  While the dispute 
concerned the legitimacy of anticipatory defense measures, the right of self-defense in response 
to non-state attacks was not contested.  Id.; see also Christopher Greenwood, War, Terrorism 
and International Law, CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 505, 517 (2003). 
 273. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 6 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal). 
 274. S.C. Res. 1540, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004). 
 275. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 6 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal); id. para. 
34 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins); see also Wedgewood, supra note 249, at 58-59; Murphy, 
supra note 256, at 68.  The ICJ did not support its conclusion with legal authority or explain why 
geopolitical status considerations eliminate the right of self-defense.  Watson, supra note 7, at 
24; Murphy, supra note 256, at 68. 
 276. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 41, ¶¶ 1-2; S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 41, ¶ 4. 
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Subsequent U.N. anti-terror resolutions confirm that there are 
no geopolitical status exclusions from the right to defend against 
terrorism as the resolutions instead call for prevention of all 
terrorism.277  Resolution 1456 states that “any acts of terrorism are 
criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, whenever 
and by whomsoever committed” and calls for “the maximum extent 
possible” of “prevention  . . . of acts of terrorism, wherever they 
occur.”278  Resolution 1566 reaffirms “the imperative to combat 
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations by all means.”279  
Prevention of all terrorism by all means, wherever and whenever it 
may occur, by whomever it may be committed, and for whatever 
motivation, must include a right to self-defense against terrorism 
regardless of the political status or geographic location of its source.  
The ICJ was wrong in excluding attacks by non-state actors 
emanating from territories under Israel’s control from Israel’s right of 
self-defense.  By the same rationale, the United States would have 
had no right to self-defense to prevent the September 11 attacks 
because they were non-state actors striking from territory under U.S. 
control.  The absurdity of this result demonstrates that the ICJ self-
defense ruling cannot be right. 
A more narrowly limited objection to Israeli self-defense against 
terrorism is the argument that Israel cannot defend settlers because 
the settlements are illegal.  This position, while not express in the ICJ 
self-defense ruling, conforms to it280 and is accepted by commentators 
supportive of the ruling.281  The primary argument made for it is that 
Israel should not obtain legal benefits from its own illegal acts.282 
There are several fatal flaws in this argument.  One is that 
violations of law do not necessarily extinguish jus ad bello self-
 
 277. S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 227, pmbl., ¶¶ 1-2; S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 226, pmbl.; 
S.C. Res. 1456, supra note 228, pmbl., ¶ 1. 
 278. S.C. Res. 1456, supra note 228, pmbl. 
 279. S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 227, pmbl.  The Security Council’s broad authorization of 
anti-terror measures is marked by imprecise draftsmanship.  As “means” to combat terrorism 
must themselves comply with international law, “all means” to combat terrorism are not 
necessarily permissible. 
 280. Kretzmer, supra note 12, at 93.  Ironically, the lone ICJ judge who expressly took the 
position that the illegality of the settlements prevents them from being defended was the 
dissenting Judge Buergenthal, who voted in Israel’s favor on all substantive issues.  Nonetheless 
he stated that a barrier protecting settlements was “ipso facto in violation of international 
humanitarian law” due to the settlements’ illegality.  Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 9 
(declaration of Judge Buergenthal). 
 281. Scobbie, supra note 205, at 84; Imseis, supra note 205, at 112. 
 282. Scobbie, supra note 205, at 84; Imseis, supra note 205, at 112. 
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defense rights.283  The right of self-defense exists throughout a conflict 
or occupation and is triggered when an armed attack takes place; the 
right is contingent on the nature of the attack and not the legal status 
of those attacked or the legality of acts precedent to the attack.284  It is 
legally incorrect to view self-defense of settlers as a legal benefit 
created by Israeli illegality.285  Rather, it is an inherent right triggered 
by Palestinian attack.  The illegality of the settlements does not 
uniformly render all defense measures to protect settlers illegal.286 
A practical problem with the “no defense of settlers” argument is 
that it literally leaves civilians defenseless.  Denying several hundred 
thousand civilian settlers defense against an array of terrorist groups 
responsible for hundreds of attacks which have killed and wounded 
thousands is utterly irreconcilable with the protection of civilians as a 
principle of international law.287  No state will comply with notions of 
self-defense that leave large numbers of civilians vulnerable to lethal 
attack,288 which is the most compelling reason why the various 
rejections of Israeli defense rights are not sustainable.  To be sure, 
what can be done to defend settlers is qualified by the obligation to 
limit the exacerbation of illegality of the settlements.  However, this is 
not an argument that there is no right to defend settlers, but rather 
that there is a limited right.  Recognition of Israel’s right to take 
carefully tailored proportional protective measures is a sensible 
application of self-defense principles. 
ii. Self-Defense Under the Agreements.  The peace agreements 
recognize Israeli self-defense rights.  The 1995 Interim Agreement 
preserves Israeli responsibility for “overall security of Israelis and 
Settlements” and affords Israel “all the powers to take the steps 
 
 283. Shany, supra note 8, at 243-44. 
 284. See Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship Between Ius ad Bellum and Ius in Bello, 
9 REV. INT’L STUD. 221, 223, 233 (1983).  While the legality of precedent acts does not eliminate 
the right of self-defense, it is a factor in determining the proportionality of self-defense 
measures.  See Kretzmer, supra note 12, at 94. 
 285. The opposite is more accurate—denying Israel self-defense rights provides Palestinians 
with legal benefit from illegal acts.  The Opinion self-defense ruling wrongly protects use of 
terrorism as a means of political contestation by preventing defense against it.  See Wedgewood, 
supra note 249, at 59.  Creating a class of Israeli civilians who are defenseless surely promotes 
violence to achieve political objectives reserved by legal obligation for negotiation. 
 286. Kretzmer, supra note 12 at 93 n.41.  
 287. Id. at 93; HRW TERRORISM REPORT, supra note 231, at 5; OXFAM REPORT, supra note 
248, at 7. 
 288. See Murphy, supra note 256, at 66. 
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necessary to meet this responsibility.”289  In the Oslo agreements and 
the Roadmap, Israel and Palestine recognized that each was 
authorized to take all steps to prevent and respond to terrorism.290  
Like Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and the Security Council anti-
terror resolutions, the agreements establish a right to defend against 
terrorism that does not exclude non-state attacks or attacks from 
occupied territory.291  In fact, protection against non-state terrorist 
attacks from occupied territory is the exact purpose of Israeli defense 
rights and protections in the agreements, because they are intended 
to allow Israel to defend itself against attacks from Palestine.  The 
peace process obligations unmistakably demonstrate Israeli-
Palestinian agreement that Israel’s right to self-defense includes 
protection against Palestinian terrorist attacks.292 
The existence of an Israeli self-defense right is further supported 
by the identity between the agreements and U.N. Security Council 
anti-terror resolutions.  The agreements and resolutions authorize all 
means necessary to prevent and respond to all terrorist activity.  
There are no exclusions in the agreements or the resolutions for non-
state terrorism or terrorism from occupied territory.  Further, the 
agreements and the resolutions authorize the same broad range of 
counterterrorism measures: prevention, law enforcement, arrest, 
prosecution, disruption of financing, and cessation of incitement.293 
The agreements also recognize Israel’s right to defend settlers.  
The 1995 Interim Agreement expressly preserved Israeli 
responsibility for security of the settlements.294  The agreements’ 
protection of all Israelis everywhere and all West Bank residents 
includes settlers.  Moreover, because disposition of settlements is 
reserved for final negotiations, Israel should have a right to protect 
civilians in the settlements until their status is resolved.295  The 
agreements’ protection of settlers supports a humanitarian 
interpretation of self-defense that does not leave civilians in occupied 
territory vulnerable to attack.  The peace accords leave no doubt that 
 
 289. 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 103, art. XII(1). 
 290. See supra Parts III.A.2.b-c. 
 291. See supra notes 266, 274, 276-79 and accompanying text. 
 292. See supra Part III.A.2.c. 
 293. See supra notes 117-28; S.C. Res. 1373; supra note 41, ¶¶ 1-3. 
 294. 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 103, art. XII § 1. 
 295. See Kretzmer, supra note 12, at 93 n.41; Wedgewood, supra note 249, at 61; Shany, 
supra note 8, at 15. 
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Israel and Palestine agreed that Israel has the right to defend all 
Israelis including settlers. 
The agreements also remove an ICJ analytical stumbling block 
on self-defense—confusion on the implications of Palestine’s 
transitional status.  The ICJ was criticized for a double standard, 
treating Palestine as a state for participatory privileges but exempting 
it from anti-terrorism obligations.296  The nascence of Palestinian 
statehood is relied on to excuse Palestine’s failure to stop terrorist 
attacks and to prohibit Israel from stopping them. 
The agreements set this confusion aside.  They establish that 
Palestine is a governmental international actor with independent legal 
personality that accepted duties characteristic and constitutive of 
statehood, including comprehensive security and law enforcement 
obligations to prevent terrorism.297  The Authority’s achievement of 
statehood is ultimately conditioned on meeting these 
responsibilities.298  Palestine’s status does not relieve it from the anti-
terror obligations it accepted.  Nor does it eliminate Israel’s right to 
self-defense, which, if anything, is more acutely and urgently 
necessary because of Palestinian non-compliance with anti-terrorism 
obligations.299  Under the agreements, Palestine has a legal duty to 
prevent terror, and Israel has a legal right to defend against it, 
regardless of whether Palestine is a state. 
The language of the agreements supports the language of 
international law in the U.N. Charter and U.N. Security Council 
resolutions.  All recognize a right to self-defense that allows Israel to 
 
 296. E.g., Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 34 (July 9) (separate opinion of Judge 
Higgins); Murphy, supra note 256, at 63 n.10.  Judge Higgins and an academic supportive of the 
ICJ ruling agreed that exempting Palestine from terrorism responsibilities because it is not a 
state is poorly reasoned formalism.  Scobbie, supra note 205, at 81; Advisory Opinion, 2004 
I.C.J. 131 para. 34 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins). 
 297. See generally the Oslo agreements referenced supra at note 103.  In addition to the 
specific indices of statehood referred throughout this Article, the agreements, most particularly 
the 1993 Declaration of Principles and the 1995 Interim Agreement, contain extensive, detailed 
provisions establishing that the Palestinian Authority is empowered to carry out governmental 
and administrative functions related to its economy, educational, law enforcement, utilities, and 
capacity to negotiate and enter into agreements with Israel. 
 298. The Roadmap calls for an immediate unconditional cessation of violence and terrorism 
in Phase I, with a recognition of a transitional Palestinian state in Phase II and permanent status 
negotiations in Phase III conditioned on international conference findings that the requirements 
in preceding phases, including an end to terrorism, have been met.  Roadmap, supra note 104, at 
1, 3-7.  Under the Oslo accords, the Palestinian counterterror obligations are immediate and 
precede statehood.  See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text. 
 299. Murphy, supra note 256, at 66-67; Wedgewood, supra note 249, at 59. 
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protect all civilians from terrorism.300  This right does not exclude 
attacks from non-state actors, attacks from occupied territory, or 
attacks on settlers.301  The ICJ holding and academic commentary 
dismissing Israeli self-defense rights are based on formalities and 
distinctions that do not appear in the Charter, resolutions, or 
agreements, and are irreconcilable with international law 
unconditionally condemning all terrorism and authorizing broad 
means to stop it. 
b. Proportionality and The Barrier.  Because the right of self-
defense is limited by the principal of proportionality, the barrier is a 
permissible means of self-defense only if it is proportional.302  
Proportionality limits self-defense measures to the minimum 
necessary to repulse attack.303  The proportionality of self-defense 
measures is assessed by flexible, case-by-case factual examination.304  
Considerations include the geographic and temporal scope of the 
measures, their selectivity, and the legality of acts leading to self-
defense.305  Proportionality also includes assessment of civilian and 
military injury.306 
The barrier’s proportionality determines its legality for many 
who have concluded that the barrier may be part of an Israeli right to 
self-defense.  Thus, in Beit Sourik, the Israeli Court’s analysis of 
barrier segments was based on proportionality.  Commentators 
critical of the ICJ self-defense ruling likewise recommend a 
proportionality analysis.307  Three ICJ judges who expressed 
disagreement with the majority’s self-defense ruling would have 
preferred that the Advisory Opinion include a proportionality 
 
 300. See supra notes 130-31, 271, 273-74, 276-78 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra notes 130-31, 271, 273-74, 276-78 and accompanying text. 
 302. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94 (June 27); Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 245 (July 8). 
 303. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 317 (7th ed. 1997). 
 304. Greenwood, supra note 284, at 223. 
 305. See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 168-69 (2d ed. 
2004) (discussing selectivity and duration); Murphy, supra note 256, at 75 n.99 (stating that 
proportionality requires direction of self-defense measures at “threat and no other objective”); 
Christopher Greenwood, Self-Defence and the Conduct of International Armed Conflict, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A TIME OF PERPLEXITY 273, 275, 278 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1989) 
(discussing geographic and temporal scope); Kretzmer, supra note 12, at 94 (discussing legality 
of precedent acts). 
 306. Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 262. 
 307. See Watson, supra note 7, at 24-25; Murphy, supra note 256, at 72-73, 75 n.99; 
Kretzmer, supra note 12, at 94. 
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analysis.308  Many proportionality proponents advocate the Beit Sourik 
approach: a segment-by-segment balance of security benefits against 
humanitarian injury.309 
However, the assumption that proportionality requires a limited 
segment-by-segment analysis is factually and legally wrong.  It is 
factually wrong because it literally fails to include all the facts and to 
judge the barrier for what it really is.  The analysis examines the 
barrier as if it were a group of physically disconnected barriers, each 
with an exclusively localized impact limited strictly to security and 
humanitarian consequences in its discreet, isolated location.  Of 
course the barrier has such impact, but it has additional consequences 
because it is not a group of segregated obstacles. 
Rather, it is a single, continuous barrier intended not just for 
isolated local impact, but to create a continuous zone of 
impenetrability that runs the entire length of Israel and Palestine.  
The barrier places on its Israeli side a large, contiguous block of 
occupied territory subject to permanent status negotiations under 
peace agreements, preserves heavily populated Israeli settlements in 
that territory, and effectively excludes non-resident Palestinians from 
such territory.  The factual inquiry required for proportionality 
analysis cannot take place under a segment-by-segment approach 
because it disregards the factual reality of the barrier’s entirety and 
the totality of its impact. 
The analysis is legally wrong in part because its crimped, 
localized, and segment-based factual examination prevents review of 
two legal issues which require consideration of the entire barrier: (1) 
the legality of the settlements; and (2) the barrier’s impact as a whole 
on the settlements and the legal status of contested territory.310  The 
implications of the barrier in relation to illegal precedent acts—
specifically, whether the barrier promotes, perpetuates, or worsens 
the illegal settlement program—is a proportionality factor.  If the 
settlement program is illegal and the barrier will ensure that the 
program will continue indefinitely and that its consequences will 
 
 308. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 34 (July 9) (separate opinion of Judge Higgins); 
id. para. 3 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans); id. para. 9 (declaration of Judge 
Buergenthal). 
 309. Id. paras. 3, 9 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal); Watson, supra note 7, at 25; Murphy, 
supra note 256, at 75; Kretzmer, supra note 12, at 94. 
 310. An advocate of segmentized analysis recognized these as legitimate proportionality 
factors.  Kretzmer, supra note 12, at 94. 
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worsen, this must be weighed significantly against the legality of the 
barrier under a proportionality analysis. 
However, the impact of the barrier in its totality cannot be 
properly considered under a segment-by-segment review.  A correct 
proportionality analysis requires consideration of the barrier and its 
impact in full rather than a dissected analysis of isolated segments and 
localized impacts.  Considering the proportionality of the barrier on a 
segment-by-segment basis alone makes as little sense as considering 
the impact of a nuclear bomb exclusively on a neighborhood-by-
neighborhood basis.  That is not how a nuclear bomb works.  Nor is 
the barrier’s impact so narrowly isolated by segment. 
The peace agreements are critical to proportionality 
consideration because, along with the law of belligerent occupation, 
they establish legal obligations that prohibit changes in the status of 
the territories.  Defense measures that illegally change the status of 
the territories—or worsen and solidify ongoing illegal status 
changes—are not proportionate. Under a proper proportionality 
analysis, the barrier route in the West Bank and Jerusalem is 
disproportionate in total (not just in parts) because its route in its 
entirety promotes, perpetuates, and is part of a lasting Israeli change 
in the status of territories that violates status preservation obligations 
under the Oslo agreements, the Roadmap, and the law of belligerent 
occupation. 
Consideration of the whole barrier demonstrates that it fails to 
meet other proportionality considerations.  It is not limited in 
geographic scope because it is not targeted to terrorist infiltration 
sites or Israeli civilian population areas.  The barrier is more like a 
territorial boundary than a self-defense measure because it extends 
continuously along the whole length of Israel and Palestine through 
unpopulated territories.  Nor is the barrier selectively targeted to 
potential attackers.  To the contrary it is both over-selective, because 
it excludes (or entraps) innocent Palestinians, and under-selective, 
because it allows terrorists on the Israeli side of the barrier to stay.  
The barrier is not limited in duration.  It has taken years to build and 
the Israeli government concedes that parts will be difficult to remove.  
The barrier cannot be rapidly deployed and promptly withdrawn in 
response to changes in the nature of the threat.  The barrier is not 
linked to the duration of the threat because it will remain for some 
time whether there is a threat or not. 
In all these respects, the barrier is disproportionate because its 
innate lack of distinction extends it beyond the scope necessary (in 
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place, persons, or time) to defend against terrorism.  What the barrier 
does with precision is block off contested territory for Israel, which is 
an illegal change of status. 
Proportionality should include consideration of alternative 
protective measures, which would block terrorists without 
impermissibly creating or promoting lasting change in the status of 
contested territory, and would meet other proportionality criteria. 311  
A barrier along the Green Line is one such measure.  If, as the Israeli 
government maintains, a barrier is necessary to prevent terrorism and 
in fact helps do so, a barrier on the border should suffice.  
Strengthening checkpoints is another legal protective measure.312  
Increased Israeli military deployment in and around settlements or 
areas of suspected terrorist activity, while surely a politically 
controversial measure with risks, is another option that would be 
temporary, geographically targeted, and would not entail a lasting 
territorial change of hands. 
A final measure is a series of unconnected ringlet barriers around 
settlements.313  This is somewhat problematic because it would 
constitute a physical change in contested territory.  Moreover, East 
Jerusalem and other settlements adjacent to Israel (or to settlements 
connecting with Israel) would almost certainly not be encircled, so 
ringlet barriers might not differ much from the present barrier.  Still, 
a ringlet system would be less of a status change, as it would leave a 
smaller contiguous zone of contested territory on the Israeli side of 
barriers and allow Palestinian access to more of the territory. 
CONCLUSION 
Political consequences flow through the legal holes in Beit Sourik 
and the Advisory Opinion.  Beit Sourik permits a barrier in occupied 
territory that aids an illegal change of status in the territory by 
preserving Israel’s illegal settlements.314  The Advisory Opinion 
ignores Palestinian terrorism and Israeli self-defense, prompting one-
sided pressure on Israel.315  Moreover, the reasoning and credibility of 
 
 311. B’tselem Barrier Report, supra note 189, at 26 (attributing most terrorist infiltrations 
into Israel to poor checkpoint scrutiny). 
 312. Id. 
 313. The Israeli Court suggested such encirclements would be legal in Mara’abe.  HCJ 
7957/04 Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel [2005] IsrSC 38(2) 393 paras. 113-16; see also 
Shany, supra note 8, at 9-10. 
 314. See supra notes 21-22, 92, 171-91 and accompanying text. 
 315. See supra notes 31-36, 54-55, 90, 229-68, 296-99 and accompanying text. 
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the Opinion were weakened by neglect of Israel’s status preservation 
obligations.316 
An agreement-based analysis corrects these failings.  The 
analysis would include rulings that the barrier results from Palestinian 
and Israeli non-compliance with reciprocal legal obligations central to 
the peace agreements.  Palestinian failure to stop terrorism violates 
the agreements along with international humanitarian law and forces 
Israel to take security measures.  Israeli expansion and perpetuation 
of the settlements violates the agreements as well as belligerent 
occupation law, and leaves Israeli citizens in occupied territories 
exposed to violence.  A proper ruling would recognize there would be 
no need for a barrier if both parties complied with the agreements. 
The agreements define an appropriate Israeli self-defense right 
because they acknowledge the right while providing a sound legal 
basis for its limitation.  The continuous barrier in occupied territory 
reserved for negotiation is a disproportionate self-defense measure 
because it perpetuates Israeli violation of status change prohibitions 
in the agreements and under the law of belligerent occupation.  Israeli 
self-defense measures in occupied territory that do not exacerbate 
impermissible status changes (and otherwise comply with legal 
restrictions) are legal.  Third parties would be barred from supporting 
Israeli status changes in the occupied territories (including an illegal 
barrier) and Palestinian terrorism. 
This analysis is legally correct.  It is based on legal obligations 
that Israel and Palestine accepted in agreements that conform to 
independent obligations under international law.317  It allows Israel to 
protect civilians, but prohibits a barrier in occupied territory that 
would almost surely serve as a durable physical border.318  It requires 
fuller, more even-handed legal and factual consideration that 
recognizes that Palestinian as well as Israeli illegalities caused the 
barrier.  It calls for a fairer international preventive response directed 
to both parties and all causes for the barrier. 
The agreement-based analysis also makes the law a tool in 
puncturing Israeli and Palestinian fictions regarding their obstructions 
of the peace process.  A holding that the barrier is part of an illegal 
status change bursts the Israeli fiction that the settlements and barrier 
are reversible measures that do not preempt negotiations on 
 
 316. See supra notes 200-10 and accompanying text. 
 317. See supra Parts III.B.1, III.C.1., III.D.2. 
 318. See supra Part III.D. 
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territorial disposition.  A holding requiring an end to Palestinian 
terrorism ruptures the Palestinian fiction that ineffective 
denunciation of a continued, unrestrained terrorist campaign is 
sufficient for negotiation and statehood.  There is much to be said for 
replacing fiction with fact, by ruling that Israel’s barrier-preserved 
territorial carve-out and Palestine’s all-but-official terrorism are both 
prohibited by agreement and are both illegal obstacles to peace. 
The agreements are a constructive framework for legal analysis 
for the same reason they are the route to peace.  They call for 
compliance with a series of interdependent obligations and provide a 
legal basis for the comprehensive, simultaneous action necessary for 
peace.319  As a result, examination of the barrier through the 
framework of obligations in the agreements is more inclusive and 
even-handed legally and factually than the fragmented analyses of 
Beit Sourik and the Advisory Opinion.   
Put simply, if Israel and Palestine did what they agreed to do in 
the peace agreements, there would be a Palestinian state instead of 
occupation, security instead of terrorism, and peace instead of a 
barrier.  To close with reference to the judges’ remarks the Article 
began with, perhaps if judges “choose to write” to enforce the peace 
agreements, the tragic tide of bereavement and pain that washes over 
Israel and Palestine would yield at last to the stillness of peace. 
 
 319. For a similar perspective without specific reference to or analysis of the agreements, 
see Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 18 (July 9) (separate opinion of Judge Higgins) 
(regretting that the ICJ did not remind the parties of their mutual obligations, requirements to 
reach agreement and “the procedural obligation to move forward simultaneously”). 
